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Abstract 
 
Inductive reasoning is of remarkable interest as it plays a crucial role in many 
human activities, including hypotheses evaluation in scientific inquiry, learning 
processes, prediction of future events, and diagnosis of a phenomenon (e.g., 
medical diagnosis). Despite the relevance of these cognitive processes in a 
variety of settings, there still remains much to understand about the basis of 
human inductive inferences. For example, it is not yet clear whether the same 
psychological mechanisms underlie both inductive reasoning and deductive 
reasoning or, on the contrary, whether induction and deduction correspond to 
distinct mental processes. 
 The study of inductive reasoning has been a traditional topic in 
epistemology, and is more recently being explored in cognitive psychology as 
well. In the present contribution, I focus on both the epistemological and the 
psychological accounts. To begin with, I illustrate the state-of-art of research on 
inductive reasoning. On one hand, epistemologists have been working to develop 
normative theories in which the notion of inductive strength (or confirmation) is 
formalized. I discuss some of the alternative Bayesian measures of confirmation 
proposed in the literature on inductive logic. On the other hand, psychologists 
have been empirically investigating inductive reasoning, discovering important 
phenomena such as systematic effects of similarity, typicality, and diversity. I 
illustrate some of the most significant models of induction proposed in the 
psychological literature to account for such phenomena.  
Both lines of inquiry – epistemological and psychological – have focused 
on a restricted kind of induction problem: when assessing the inductive strength 
of arguments, premises are assumed to be true, that is, ascertained with the 
maximum degree of probability. However, inductive arguments occurring in real 
settings often depart from this pattern. Indeed, in a variety of situations, one 
may need to assess the impact of a piece of evidence whose probability may have 
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significantly changed while not attaining certainty. Evidential uncertainty in 
inductive inferences is at the core of the present research.  
After exploring a selection of psychological phenomena concerning 
uncertainty, I address the epistemological problem of how to extend Bayesian 
confirmation theory to include cases where the evidence is not certain. A 
straightforward solution is proposed for a major class of confirmation measures 
called P-incremental. The solution proposed is based on Jeffrey 
conditionalization, an essential formal principle discussed below in greater 
detail. 
On the psychological account, I discuss two experimental studies 
conducted to test whether and how people’s judgments of inductive strength 
depend on the degree of evidential uncertainty. In the first study the uncertainty 
of evidence is explicitly manipulated by means of numerical values, whereas in 
the second study uncertainty is implicitly manipulated by means of ambiguous 
pictures. The results show that people’s judgments are highly correlated with 
those predicted by two normatively sound Bayesian measures of confirmation. 
This sensitivity to the degree of evidential uncertainty supports the centrality of 
inductive reasoning in cognition, and opens the path to further investigations on 
induction in real contexts. 
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Chapter 1  
Inductive reasoning 
 
1.1 In the epistemological literature 
 
1.1.1 Historical overview of inductive logic 
 
In Book V of the Organon, Aristotle theorizes the notion of induction as follows: 
 
Induction is a passage from particulars to universals, e.g. the 
argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, 
and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled 
man is the best at his particular task.  
(Aristotle, Topics, I, 12, 105a, Barnes, 1985, p. 175) 
 
In Aristotle’s view, induction is confined to generalization from particular to 
universal knowledge. This view seems to have influenced the way of thinking 
about induction for several centuries (see Fitelson, 2005, for details on historical 
developments of inductive logic). The scope of inductive logic became wider only 
with the advent of more precise and sophisticated accounts of the notion of 
probability. The mathematical work carried out during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, in particular by Bayes, Laplace, and Boole, set the basis for a rigorous 
analysis of induction. Yet, only since the 20th century, inductive logic has been 
regarded as a general, quantitative tool to evaluate arguments. 
In logic, an argument is a finite list of propositions, i.e., a list of statements 
that can be either true or false. One of the propositions in the list is the 
conclusion of the argument, whereas the others are called premises. In general, 
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the premises are supposed to provide reasons in support of the conclusion. In 
schematic representations, a horizontal line is usually placed between the 
premises and the conclusion. For example, if , … ,  are the premises of an 
arbitrary argument, and  is its conclusion, then the argument will be 
represented in the following schematic form: 
 
 
—
 
 
An alternative way to schematically represent an argument from the premises , … ,  to the conclusion  is , … ,  / . 
Many contemporary texts on introductory logic assert that there are two 
kinds of arguments: deductive and inductive. In deductive arguments, the truth 
of the premises , … ,  guarantees the truth of the conclusion . By contrast, 
in inductive arguments the truth of the premises can only affect the credibility of 
the conclusion to different degrees, without any guarantee of the truth of .  
Put another way, the main aspect that distinguishes the two kinds of 
arguments is that a deductive argument can be either valid or not valid. 
Deductive logic offers strict standards with which to establish the validity of an 
argument. Hacking (2001), for example, has identified the following equivalent 
features as characteristics of any deductively valid argument:  
• the conclusion  follows from the premises , … , ; 
• whenever the premises , … ,  are true, the conclusion  must be true 
too; 
• the conclusion  is a logical consequence of the premises , … , ; 
• the conclusion  is implicitly contained in the premises , … , . 
Inductive arguments, on the contrary, are perilous because the conclusion  
might be false, even if all of the premises , … ,  are true. Thus, the concept of 
validity cannot be applied to inductive arguments.  
 In the epistemological literature 
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While deductive logic offers qualitative criteria to assess whether an 
argument is valid or not – the conclusion either does or does not follow from the 
premises – inductive logic offers finer-grained quantitative standards of 
evaluation for arguments – the premises can support the conclusion to different 
degrees. On one hand, deductive logic attempts to clarify the concept of validity. 
On the other hand, inductive logic attempts to clarify a quantitative 
generalization of this concept. The generalization of the validity concept is often 
termed inductive strength. 
 The idea of inductive logic as a general theory of argument evaluation 
traces back at least to Keynes’s (1921) Treatise on Probability. Keynes seeks to 
define a logical relation between the premises and conclusion in case of 
arguments that are inductive, i.e., arguments for which it is not possible to 
logically derive the conclusion from the premises. In a later seminal work, 
Logical Foundations of Probability, Rudolf Carnap (1950) discusses the 
possibility of constructing a theory of induction that aims to generalize classical 
deductive logic. He very clearly develops the concept of ‘confirmation’ as a 
quantitative generalization of deductive entailment. In the present study, the 
term ‘confirmation’ used by Carnap will be regarded as equivalent to the term 
‘inductive strength’ mentioned above.  
The following quotation from Carnap (1950) introduces the main idea 
underlying his project on inductive logic, and explicates the relation between 
inductive and deductive logic: 
 
Deductive logic may be regarded as the theory of the relation 
of logical consequences, and inductive logic as the theory of 
another concept which is likewise objective and logical, viz., 
[…] degree of confirmation.  
(Carnap, 1950, p. 43) 
 
According to Fitelson (2005), most of the contemporary epistemologists have 
been influenced by Carnap’s work. Indeed, the following three fundamental 
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tenets, inspired by Carnap’s ideas, have been largely accepted as the foundation 
of modern inductive logic:  
1. inductive logic should offer a quantitative generalization of deductive 
logic. Deductive entailments and deductive refutations should be 
considered as limiting cases of inductive relations. Therefore, inductive 
logic should assign extreme quantitative values to them. Partial 
entailments and partial refutations, instead, should be associated with 
quantitative values included between those extremes;  
2. inductive logic should employ probability as its fundamental building 
block; 
3. inductive logic should be objective and logical, as explicitly emphasized in 
Carnap’s quotation. 
Together, the three tenets are intended to characterize a quantitative relation  
of confirmation, or inductive strength. It is worth observing that the 
desideratum (2) highlights the centrality of the probability concept to the 
modern inductive logic (see Appendix  for a definition of the probability 
notion).  
Whilst the first two desiderata are fairly clear, the third desideratum is 
more ambiguous. The following two quotations, again from Carnap (1950), 
illustrate Carnap’s understanding of desideratum (3), i.e., in what sense 
objectivity and logicality should be applied to inductive logic: 
 
That c is an objective concept means this: if a certain c value 
holds for a certain hypothesis with respect to a certain 
evidence, then this value is entirely independent of what any 
person may happen to think about these sentences, just as the 
relation of logical consequence is independent in this respect. 
(Carnap, 1950, p.43) 
 
The principal common characteristic of the statements in 
both fields [viz., deductive and inductive logic] is their 
 In the epistemological literature 
5 
 
 
 
independence of the contingency of facts. This characteristic 
justifies the application of the common term ‘logic’ to both 
fields. 
(Carnap, 1950, p. 200) 
 
In spite of Carnap’s efforts to explain the meaning of desideratum (3), the 
requirement of objectivity and logicality for the notion of confirmation appears 
to be the most problematic. 
A first attempt to define inductive logic as a quantitative generalization of 
classical deductive logic is illustrated as follows: as already mentioned, 
deductive logic requires that an argument , … ,  /  is valid iff the 
conditional   …     is necessarily true. Therefore, the relation of 
inductive strength might be defined as follows. The inductive strength of the 
argument from , … ,  to  is directly proportional to the probability that the 
conditional   …     is true.  
This proposal is called naïve inductive logic (NIL) by Fitelson (2005). 
More formally, NIL can be expressed as follows: 
 , , … ,  is high iff   …     is high.                          (NIL) 
 
As pointed out by Skyrms (2000), this first, naïve attempt is not adequate to 
quantitatively generalize the concept of deductive validity. Skyrms stresses the 
fact that it is easy to conceive arguments whose inductive strength is not high, 
while the relative conditionals are highly probable. Consider, for example, the 
following argument suggested by Skyrms (2000): 
 
There is a man in Cleveland who is 1999 years and 11-months-old and  
in good health 
——————————————————————————————— 
No man will live to be 2000 years old 
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According to Skyrms, the probability that “no man will live to be 2000 years old” 
is high per se. This high probability value makes the conditional    highly 
probable too. However, the argument in question is not strong, since the premise 
does not support the conclusion. If anything, the former seems to disconfirm the 
latter. Hence, the quantitative value given by the formula   …     
is not appropriate to represent the confirmation notion, for it is not able to 
capture the relation between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. In 
general,   …     can be high because either the probability of  is 
high, or the probability of   …   is low. As a consequence,   …     does not reflect the evidential relation between premises and 
conclusion.  
These considerations led Skyrms (2000) to defend an alternative account. 
Fitelson (2005) refers to this new perspective as the received view (TRV) about 
inductive logic: 
 
 , , … ,  ! |  …                (TRV) 
 
According to the received view, the conditional probability of , given   …  , should be employed to measure the inductive strength of the argument , … ,  /  (see Appendix  for a definition of conditional probability). This 
position has been accepted by many authors, including Keynes (1921) and 
Carnap (1950) in particular. 
 As will be seen, TRV does not satisfy desideratum (3) either. Here the 
issue concerns more generally probabilistic models and how they should be 
interpreted. In fact, there are several ways in which probabilities can be 
interpreted. The two interpretations most commonly encountered in the domain 
of inductive logic are the following: the epistemic and the logical interpretations.  
With epistemic interpretations of probability,  is understood as the 
degree of belief that an agent assigns to the proposition . This degree of belief 
depends on the probability model " that represents the epistemic state of the 
agent (see Appendix  for a definition of probability model). Instead, for logical 
 In the epistemological literature 
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interpretations of probability, | is understood as a quantitative 
generalization of a deductive relation between the propositions  and .  
 Presumably, Keynes (1921) appeals to an epistemic interpretation of 
probability in his Treatise on Probability. He writes: 
 
Let our premises consist of any set of propositions h, and our 
conclusion consist of any set of proposition a, then, if a 
knowledge of h justifies a rational degree of belief in a of 
degree x, we say that there is a probability-relation of degree 
x between a and h. 
(Keynes, 1921, p. 4) 
 
If probabilities are interpreted epistemically, it is not so evident how TRV can 
satisfy desideratum (3), concerning objectivity and logicality of the inductive 
relation . In his view of inductive logic, Keynes seems to maintain that 
conditional probabilities are objective. He says: 
 
Once the facts are given which determine our knowledge, 
what is probable or improbable in these circumstances has 
been fixed objectively, and is independent of our opinion. 
(Keynes, 1921, p. 4) 
 
However, he later acknowledges that conditional probabilities may vary 
depending on the agent’s background knowledge, and so they are not objective. 
Carnap (1950) was aware of the problem regarding the epistemic 
interpretations of probabilities. He tried to solve it by formulating logical 
interpretations of probability. This approach would allow TRV to directly satisfy 
desideratum (3). Indeed, if the posterior probability is logical in its nature, then 
inductive confirmation automatically will turn out to be logical too. 
Carnap’s attempts to construct a logical and objective measure of 
confirmation are numerous (see Carnap, 1950, 1952, 1971, and 1980). But, in 
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the end, none of these attempts was considered entirely appropriate to ground 
the TRV account of inductive logic. The main reason is that Carnap’s theories 
cannot be regarded as logical. For instance, in his early work, Carnap uses the 
principle of indifference, which assumes that certain propositions are 
equiprobable a priori. According to Carnap, this principle can be applied only to 
events that reveal some symmetries, in relation to an agent’s background 
knowledge. In other words, the principle of indifference can be applied only to 
events that appear to be indistinguishable, with respect to a probability model ". Thus, Carnap’s theories do not seem to be logical, unless Carnap justifies the 
choice of the probability model " to be selected. 
To recap, both Keynes and Carnap develop confirmation functions which 
depend on some contingencies. They both try to eliminate these contingencies in 
an attempt to render  objective and logical. Nonetheless, their relative 
strategies use, more or less implicitly, some a priori probability model, i.e., some 
elements of subjectivity. 
Fitelson (2005) points out that there exists a more direct way to 
guarantee the objectivity and logicality of confirmation. It is sufficient that the 
notion of inductive strength explicitly refers to a particular probability model. 
Not only does the relation between premises and conclusion count, but a 
probability model also needs to be included in the definition of . Following this 
approach, the received view should be modified into the following revisited form: 
 
The inductive strength of the argument , … ,  / , with respect  
to a probability model ", is given by #|  …                      (TRVr) 
 
In this way, judgments of confirmation are overtly relative to certain probability 
models, which are selected a priori. This solves all the problems caused by the 
presence of contingency factors.  
 But, if probability models are chosen from the beginning, an important 
question may arise: based on what criteria do we select the most adequate 
probability model in an inductive context? Despite its relevance, this question 
 In the epistemological literature 
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should not be answered by inductive logicians. To illustrate the reasons, the 
strict analogy between deductive and inductive logic should be noted. On one 
hand, deductive relations depend on a propositional language. On the other 
hand, inductive relations depend on a probabilistic model. The problem of which 
language should be used is external to deductive logic. Yet, once a language has 
been chosen, the deductive logician should employ objective and logical 
standards to tell which relations are deductively valid in that language. A similar 
point can be made about the inductive logician. It is not up to the inductive 
logician to suggest which probability model should be utilized. However, once a 
probability model has been selected, the inductive logician should tell how to 
determine inductive relations objectively and logically. 
 Although the TRVr proposal transparently solves all the difficulties 
caused by the requirement of objectivity and logicality, the revised formulation 
of inductive confirmation has problems too. In general, #|  …   
might be high solely by virtue of # being high, and not because of any 
evidential relation between , … ,  and . 
To illustrate, consider the following argument proposed by Fitelson 
(2005): 
  
Fred Fox (who is a male) has been taking birth control pills  
for the past year 
—————————————————————————— 
Fred Fox is not pregnant 
 
Fitelson points out that, once a probability model has been selected to 
appropriately capture the background knowledge about human biology, the 
conditional probability of the conclusion is very high. And this is simply because 
the unconditional probability of the conclusion – the probability that Fred Fox is 
not pregnant – is very high. Indeed Fred Fox is a male. In contrast with the 
prediction of TRVr, it is hard to claim that a strong evidential relation links the 
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premise and the conclusion of the argument in question. In fact, the premise 
seems to be irrelevant to the conclusion.  
This kind of criticism is similar to that made by Skyrms (2000) in 
opposition to the NIL proposal. If the premises are intended to provide evidence 
in support of (or against) the conclusion, then the set of premises should affect 
the probability of the conclusion. This leads to an additional desideratum for the 
inductive confirmation . This fourth desideratum can be formulated as follows: 
 
4. , , … ,  should be sensitive to the probabilistic relevance of   …   to . 
 
Since #|  …   is not sensitive to the relevance of the premises to the 
conclusion, the TRVr account should be ruled out as a proposal for defining 
inductive strength. 
 To summarize, the desiderata (1)-(4) have been identified to characterize 
the notion of inductive confirmation. Fitelson (2005) combines all the four 
desiderata in the following unique desideratum, called probabilistic inductive 
logic (PIL): 
  
, , … , , " is 
&'(
')maximal and 0 0 if  , … ,  entails 0 0 if  #|  …   0 #! 0 if  #|  …   ! #5 0 if  #|  …   5 #minimal and 5 0 if  , … ,  entails                       PIL
9 
 
It is worth recalling that the confirmation function , , … , , " aims to 
measure the extent to which a set of premises , … ,  inductively supports a 
conclusion , once a given probability model " has been specified. It is also 
worth noting that any measure satisfying PIL also satisfies all four desiderata. 
Indeed, for the first desideratum, observe that  assigns extreme values to 
deductive entailments and deductive refutations, whereas intermediate values 
are assigned to partial entailments and partial refutations. The second 
 In the epistemological literature 
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desideratum is satisfied because the constraints on ’s values are expressed in 
terms of probability. As for the third desideratum, it is enough to notice that  
depends on a probability model ", and so its values are logical and objective 
with respect to ". Finally, sensitivity to probabilistic relevance is modeled in 
PIL: , … ,  are irrelevant to  just in case #|  …   ! #, 
with a consequent inductive strength equal to zero (see §1.1.2, for further 
details). 
 
1.1.2 Some Bayesian measures of confirmation 
 
A large number of alternative measures of confirmation  are proposed and 
advocated in the epistemological literature (see Fitelson, 1999, for a survey of 
the various measures of inductive support). In what follows, I discuss some 
representative confirmation measures that have been defended over the years, 
in an attempt to single out those measures appearing to be the soundest from a 
normative point of view. 
 Most of the contemporary epistemologists have followed a Bayesian 
approach for a formalization of the degree of confirmation. In general, 
epistemologists have focused on the degree of confirmation provided by a piece 
of evidence  for a hypothesis  under test. In other words, they have been 
typically involved with the inductive strength of arguments which take the form  / . 
According to Fitelson (1999), a measure of confirmation  is called a 
relevance measure, if  is sensitive to the probabilistic relevance of  to . This is 
to say,  is a relevance measure, if it satisfies the desideratum (4) illustrated in 
§1.1.1. In mathematical terms, any relevance measure must comply with the 
following constraints1: 
                                               
1
 As noted in §1.1.1, any measure of confirmation should be defined with respect to a given 
probability model ". Put another way,  should depend on agents’ background knowledge. I omit 
background knowledge to simplify the notation. 
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,  :0 0 if | 0 ! 0 if | ! 5 0 if | 5                                                                      RM9 
 
It is said that  confirms , in case | 0 ,  disconfirms , in case | 5 , and  is confirmationally irrelevant to , otherwise. As 
Fitelson (2001b) and Festa (1996) point out, it is possible to reformulate the 
condition (RM) in several equivalent ways. In fact, it is not difficult to prove that, 
for example, the following conditions are logically equivalent to (RM), according 
to the theory of probability: 
  
 ,  0/!/5 0 if    0/!/5  = , 
  
 ,  0/!/5 0 if | 0/!/5 |, 
  
 ,  0/!/5 0 if | 0/!/5 , 
 
 ,  0/!/5 0 if | 0/!/5 |. 
 
 (RM) and its equivalent formulations put only qualitative constraints on the 
values that a relevance measure should assign to inductive arguments. On the 
quantitative account, there are several ways of defining relevance measures of 
confirmation. For example, it is possible to construct a quantitative measure , 
by taking the difference between the left and right hand side of any inequalities 
above. So, for instance, both ,  ! | >  and ,  !| >  are relevance measures able to quantify the degree of 
evidential support. Another possibility to form qua
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(RM) is provided by taking the logarithm2 of the ratio between the left and right 
hand side of any inequalities above. For instance, ?,  ! log @ ABC|DABC|DE is 
another quantitative relevance measure. Or also, relevance measures can be 
obtained by subtracting the numerical value 1 from the previous ratios. For 
instance, F,  ! ABD|CABD > 1. 
 Some of the most representative relevance measures of confirmation, 
collected from the literature, are shown in Table 1.1 below3. Since the measures 
presented so far are constructed in a way that they all satisfy the qualitative 
condition (RM), it might be expected that all of them impose the same ordering 
over different arguments. In other words, it might be expected that all the 
relevance measures are ordinally equivalent, in accordance with the following 
precise definition: 
 
Definition 1.1: Two confirmation measures ,  and ,  are said to be ordinally equivalent just in case, for any 
pair of arguments  /  and  / : 
 
 ,  0/!/5  ,  iff ,  0/!/5 , . 
 
                                               
2
 Obviously, the logarithm must have base > 1. In fact, in case of base > 1, logarithm maps 
quantities > 1 onto positive values, quantities < 1 onto negative values, and quantities = 1 onto 
zero.  
3 Among the advocates of the measure H are Eells (1982), Gillies (1986), Earman (1992), Jeffrey 
(1992), and Rosenkrantz (1994). Advocates of I include Christensen (1999) and Joyce (1999).  
is Carnap’s (1962a) relevance measure. Among those who have defended J are Keynes (1921), 
Horwich (1982), Schlesinger (1995), Milne (1996), and Pollard (1999). Advocates of K include 
Kemeny and Oppenheim (1952), Good (1984), Pearl (1988), and Fitelson (2001a, 2001b). 
Finally, Crupi, Tentori, and Gonzalez (2007) recently advocated L. Observe that the positive 
branch of L is identical to Rips’s (2001, p. 129) quantitative measure of inductive strength and 
ordinally equivalent to a confirmation measure proposed by Gaifman (1979, p. 120). Further 
occurrences of L include Rescher (1958), Shortliffe and Buchanan (1975), Mura (2006, 2008), 
and Cooke (1991). 
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Surprisingly, it can be proven that Table 1.1 includes no pair of ordinally 
equivalent measures (see Crupi et al., 2007; Fitelson, 2001b).   
 
Table 1.1: Rival Bayesian measures of confirmation 
 
 H,  ! | >  
 I,  ! | > | 
 ,  !    >  =  
 J,  ! | > 1 
 K,  ! | > || M | 
 
L,  !
&'(
')| >  if | 0 | >  otherwise
9 
 
 
The non-equivalence between confirmation measures implies important 
consequences. Many criticisms and paradoxes have surrounded the Bayesian 
theory of confirmation. Practitioners of Bayesianism have attempted to resolve 
these paradoxes and criticisms by identifying some relevant properties that any 
appropriate measure of confirmation should satisfy. As will be seen, these 
relevant properties are not shared by measures that are not ordinally 
equivalent. Thus, by analyzing the properties that characterize each measure 
presented in Table 1.1, it is possible to narrow down the field of competing 
measures. 
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PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION 
 One of the most famous paradoxes of confirmation is the so-called ravens 
paradox. This paradox is based on the following two assumptions: 
• Universal statements are confirmed by their positive instances. For 
example, the proposition “this raven is black” confirms the hypothesis “all 
ravens are black”. 
• If  confirms , and if  is logically equivalent to , then  also 
confirms . 
From the two assumptions above, it is possible to deduce the following 
paradoxical conclusion: the proposition “this laptop is red” confirms the 
hypothesis “all ravens are black”. In general, any proposition involving objects 
that are non-raven or non-black confirms the hypothesis that all ravens are 
black. 
The resolution of the ravens paradox proposed by Horwich (1982) is 
based on the following property, which should be satisfied by proper 
confirmation measures: 
 
 If | 0 |, then ,  0 , .                                    (P-1) 
 
It can be proven that the measures H, J, K, and L have the property expressed in 
(P-1), whereas I and  do not (see Fitelson, 2001b; Crupi et al., 2007). 
 The grue paradox, originally conceived by Goodman (1983), makes things 
even worse for the support of universal statements by means of empirical 
evidence. This paradox shows that, for every hypothesis confirmed by a piece of 
evidence, there are many alternative hypotheses which are equally confirmed by 
the same piece of evidence, but are inconsistent with the initial hypothesis. To 
illustrate the paradox, Goodman defines the predicate grue as follows: it “applies 
to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in 
case they are blue” (Goodman, 1983, p. 74). 
The statement “a is an emerald and a is green” confirms the hypothesis 
“all emeralds are green”. According to Goodman, the observation that “a is an 
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emerald and a is green” also confirms the hypothesis “all emeralds are grue”, if 
the observation is made before time N. This is absurd because generalizations 
like “all emeralds are grue” imply the incompatible prediction that “if an emerald 
subsequently examined is grue, it is blue and hence not green” (Goodman, 1983, p. 
74). 
 A resolution of the grue paradox is offered by Sober (1994). His 
resolution relies on the following property:  
 
If   ,   , and  0 , then  ,  0 , .         (P-2) 
 
All the relevance measures presented in Table 1.1, apart from J, satisfy the 
property expressed in (P-2). 
Another difficulty, encountered by advocates of Bayesian inductive 
confirmation, is given by the problem of irrelevant conjunction. This problem 
concerns the deductive account of confirmation, which posits that  confirms  
if   . Thus, for the monotonicity of , it follows that: if  deductively 
confirms , then  also deductively confirms   , for any . The problem 
arises when the conjunct  is totally irrelevant to  and . Even in these cases, 
the evidence  should continue to confirm the conjunction   . 
 A solution to the problem of irrelevant conjunction relies on the following 
property (see Fitelson, 2001b): 
 
If  confirms , and  is confirmationally irrelevant to   
with respect to , then ,  0   , .               (P-3) 
 
All measures in Table 1.1 satisfy the property expressed in (P-3), except J. 
 
SYMMETRIES AND ASYMMETRIES OF CONFIRMATION 
 As highlighted by Eells and Fitelson (2002), it is possible to further 
narrow the field of competing measures of confirmation by appealing to simple 
consideration of symmetry. For example, it appears reasonable to require that 
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the inductive strength of the argument  /  is different from the inductive 
strength of  / . This is because, in general, the degree of support provided by a 
piece of evidence  for a hypothesis  is not equal to that provided by  for .  
Eells and Fitelson (2002) analyze only four kinds of symmetries: the 
“evidence symmetry”, for which ,  ! >, , the “commutativity 
symmetry”, for which  ,  ! , , “the hypothesis symmetry”, for which ,  ! >, , and “the total symmetry”, for which ,  ! , . 
They argue that only the hypothesis symmetry should be satisfied by any 
adequate measure of confirmation. 
A complete study on all the symmetries is provided by Crupi et al. (2007). 
Crupi and colleagues suggest a general principle to determine which symmetries 
should be fulfilled and which should not. The principle, called Ex2, is inspired by 
the Carnapian view according to which inductive logic should provide a 
quantitative generalization of classical deductive logic. It is worth noting that 
Crupi et al. (2007) analyze symmetry properties both in case of confirmation 
and in case of disconfirmation. Interestingly, they agree with Eells and Fitelson 
(2002) about the inadequacy of the commutative symmetry ,  ! , , 
but just in case of confirmation. Instead, in case of disconfirmation, Crupi and 
colleagues argue that the commutative symmetry is a reasonable extension of 
the following theorem of deductive logic:    iff   .  
Among the relevance measures included in Table 1.1, Crupi et al. (2007) 
prove that only L satisfies all the symmetry properties determined by means of 
the principle Ex2. 
To recap, the strength and weakness of the most representative relevance 
measures are summarized in Table 1.2. The last column of the table shows that K 
and L are the only relevance measures satisfying the condition PIL discussed in 
§1.1.1. This is to say, K and L are the only measures that assign extreme 
quantitative values to deductive entailments and deductive refutations (see 
Crupi et al., 2007; Fitelson, 2001b). 
Looking at the Table 1.2, K and L appear to be the soundest normative 
measures of confirmation. 
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Table 1.2: Strength and weakness of the most representative 
Bayesian confirmation measures 
 
Confirmation 
measures 
Ravens 
paradox 
Grue 
paradox 
Irrelevant 
conjunction 
Ex2 
symmetries 
PIL 
H,       
I,       
,       
J,       
K,       
L,       
 
 
1.2 In the psychological literature 
 
1.2.1 Induction vs. deduction 
 
Inductive reasoning is a central topic in cognitive science. However, despite its 
fundamental role in the comprehension of human cognition and behavior, 
psychologists have carried out much less work on inductive reasoning than on 
deductive reasoning. 
 As suggested by Heit (2007), there are two different views on the study of 
inductive reasoning as compared to deductive reasoning: the “problem view” 
and the “process view”. The first view points out how problems of induction may 
differ from problems of deduction, whereas the second view puts emphasis on 
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how inductive processes may differ from deductive ones. According to the 
problem view, it is possible to recognize whether a study is about inductive vs. 
deductive reasoning on the basis of some easily identifiable characteristic 
elements. For instance, most psychological studies on inductive reasoning have 
used a particular kind of induction, namely, category-based induction, which 
involves arguments regarding different categories. It is also to be noted that, in 
studies on inductive reasoning, participants are typically asked to judge the 
strength of a single argument, or to judge which of two arguments is stronger. 
On the other hand, research on deductive reasoning tends to ask participants to 
evaluate the logical validity of arguments. In this kind of study, arguments can 
have the if-then form or can involve statements like “All humans are mortal”.  
The problem view, therefore, offers the possibility of defining deduction 
and induction in an objective way, in terms of the problem being solved or the 
question being asked. Yet, in some cases the problem view cannot help clarify 
whether a study centres on deductive vs. inductive reasoning. For example, 
Wason’s selection task has been argued to be a problem of deduction by some 
authors, but induction by others (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Feeney & 
Handley, 2000; Poletiek, 2001).  
The problem view does not seem viable not only because some studies 
remain unclassified, but also for the following important consideration. It would 
be a mistake to assume that people are performing deductive reasoning simply 
because they are presented with well designated deduction problems, and 
analogously, that people are performing inductive reasoning when presented 
with induction problems. It seems desirable to consider deduction and induction 
as possible kinds of psychological processes.  
According to the process view, the distinction between deduction and 
induction depends on the underlying mental processes. At a more general level, 
reasoning surely involves many different psychological processes. An interesting 
question, though, is whether the same processing account can be applied to both 
deduction and induction, or whether two different processing accounts can be 
applied to the two respective types of reasoning.  
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On the one-process account, the same kind of processing underlies both 
induction and deduction. In other words, there is essentially one kind of 
reasoning, which may be applied to a variety of problems, either inductive or 
deductive. By contrast, according to the two-process account, there are two 
distinct kinds of reasoning.  
 The mental model theory proposed by Johnson-Laird (1983) is usually 
thought of as a one-process account. The probabilistic account proposed by 
Oaksford and Chater (1994) as an alternative to the mental model theory is also 
a one-process account, as it claims that people solve problems of deduction by 
using inductive processes. While the two previous accounts were developed 
mainly in respect to problems of deduction, other reasoning accounts have 
focused on problems of induction (e.g., Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 
1990; Sloman, 1993; Heit, 1998). These accounts can treat some inductively 
strong arguments as a special case of deductively valid arguments. For example, 
the following inductive argument is also deductively valid since there is a perfect 
overlap between the premise category and the conclusion category, with the 
property being kept fixed: 
 
Cats have Property  
————————— 
Cats have Property  
 
In the previous example, the same processing mechanisms – e.g., those that 
govern overlap assessments – would be applied to both problems of induction 
and deduction. Therefore, these accounts of induction, too, may be considered as 
one-process accounts. However, it should be noted that, in general, the validity 
of deductive arguments cannot be assessed simply in terms of overlap between 
premise and conclusion categories. By consequence, these accounts of induction 
cannot explain deductive phenomena in a proper way. 
In contrast to one-process accounts, other researchers have emphasized 
the existence of two different kinds of reasoning (e.g., Sloman, 1996; Evans & 
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Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999). In support of the two-process account, Osherson 
et al. (1998) have provided some neuropsychological evidence, obtained using 
brain imaging techniques, suggesting the existence of two anatomically separate 
systems of reasoning. In Osherson et al.’s (1990) research, participants were 
presented with a set of arguments to evaluate. Using the same arguments, 
participants were asked to judge deductive validity and inductive plausibility. 
The result was that distinct brain areas seemed to be implicated for deduction 
vs. induction.  
It would be difficult to explain the previous result, if deduction and 
induction processes were essentially the same. Yet, it seems too early to 
abandon the one-process account. Heit (2007) also suggests not abandoning 
another possibility, namely that the deduction and induction processes may 
overlap, at least to some extent. In order to answer the many issues concerning 
the process view, more studies are clearly needed. 
 
1.2.2 Some psychological models of induction 
 
In contrast to deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning is characterized by a 
sense of ambiguity, vagueness and indecision. Following Rehder (2007), 
inductive reasoning is “reasoning to uncertain conclusions” (p. 81). Such 
reasoning appears in different forms in everyday life. In some cases, uncertain 
inference involves a given object; in other cases, it may concern a specific event. 
For example, when we come across a dog on the street, we may wonder if it is 
safe to pet. Or, when we pick a mushroom while walking in the mountains, we 
may ask if it is safe to eat. There are also cases in which people may need to 
make inductive generalizations aimed at characterizing an entire class of objects 
or situations. We induce, for example, that mosquitoes can cause malaria on the 
basis of a finite number of medical situations. Or, starting from a few 
observations, one might generalize a specific property to all the members of a 
particular category. Generalizations in which properties are projected to an 
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entire class of objects are called category-based generalizations. The work by 
Osherson et al. (1990) represents a landmark in the study of category-based 
induction.  
 
SIMILARITY-COVERAGE MODEL 
The model proposed by Osherson et al. (1990) can predict the strength of a 
particular set of inductive arguments. Premises and conclusions of all the 
arguments analyzed by the authors have the form “all members of  have 
property ”, that is, premises and conclusions attribute a fixed property to one 
or more categories. A typical example of argument employed in the study is the 
following: 
 
Sparrows have sesamoid bones 
Eagles have sesamoid bones 
—————————————— 
All birds have sesamoid bones 
 
An important limitation in Osherson et al.’s (1990) work is that the focus of their 
analysis is on the role of categories in the evaluation of argument strength. 
Instead, the role of properties appearing in premises and conclusions is minimal. 
The authors acknowledge that prior beliefs about a property “can be expected to 
weigh heavily on argument strength, defeating [the] goal of focusing on the role of 
categories in the transmission of belief from premises to conclusions”. The authors 
continue, stating: “For this reason, the arguments to be examined all involve 
predicates about which subjects have few beliefs, such as “require biotin for 
hemoglobin synthesis”. Such predicates are called blank. Although blank predicates 
are recognizably scientific in character (in the latter case, biological), they are 
unlikely to evoke beliefs that cause one argument to have more strength than 
another” (p. 186). 
Even within the restricted set of arguments examined in their study, 
Osherson and colleagues have documented 13 qualitative phenomena about 
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inductive strength. The phenomena are classified on the basis of argument’s 
features. In particular, the authors distinguish three classes of arguments: 
general, specific, and mixed arguments.  
Below is a description of some of the most important phenomena 
documented by Osherson et al. (1990), along with a pair of arguments to 
illustrate each. In what follows, CAT(O) and CAT() denote the category that 
appears in premise O  and in conclusion , respectively. 
 
Premise typicality: The more representative or typical CAT(), …, CAT() are of 
CAT(), the higher is the inductive strength of the argument , … ,  / .  
 
Robins have property  
———————————  (OSWLS-1) 
All birds have property  
 
Penguins have property  
————————————  (OSWLS-2)  
All birds have property  
 
Argument (OSWLS-1) is stronger than argument (OSWLS-2) because robins are 
more typical than penguins of BIRD category. 
 
Premise diversity: The less similar CAT(), …, CAT() are among themselves, 
the higher is the inductive strength of the argument , … ,  / .  
 
Hippopotamuses have property  
Hamsters have property  
———————————————  (OSWLS-3) 
All mammals have property  
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Hippopotamuses have property  
Rhinoceroses have property  
———————————————  (OSWLS-4) 
All mammals have property  
 
Argument (OSWLS-3) is stronger than argument (OSWLS-4) because hippos and 
hamsters differ from each other more than hippos and rhinos do. 
 
Premise monotonicity: The more inclusive is the set of premises of an argument, 
the higher is the inductive strength of that argument.  
 
Hawks have property  
Sparrows have property  
Eagles have property  
————————————  (OSWLS-5) 
All birds have property  
 
Sparrows have property  
Eagles have property  
————————————  (OSWLS-6)  
All birds have property  
 
Argument (OSWLS-5) is stronger than argument (OSWLS-6) because the set of 
premises is more inclusive in the first case than in the second one. 
 
Premise-conclusion similarity: The more similar CAT(), …, CAT() are to 
CAT(), the higher is the inductive strength of the argument , … ,  / .  
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Robins have property  
Bluejays have property  
————————————  (OSWLS-7) 
Sparrows have property  
 
Robins have property  
Bluejays have property  
———————————  (OSWLS-8) 
Geese have property  
 
Argument (OSWLS-7) is stronger than argument (OSWLS-8) because robins and 
bluejays resemble sparrows more than they resemble geese. 
 Osherson et al. (1990) observe that each phenomenon should be 
recognized as a guideline directing the evaluation of inductive strength rather 
than as a strict rule determining the strength of an argument. For example, re-
examine the pair of arguments (OSWLS-3) and (OSWLS-4) in light of premise 
typicality and premise diversity. Argument (OSWLS-3) is stronger than 
argument (OSWLS-4) according to the diversity effect, even though hamsters are 
less typical than rhinoceroses of MAMMAL category. Thus, here diversity effect 
is in competition with typicality effect, and the greater diversity of the premise 
categories in argument (OSWLS-3) seems to prevail over the greater typicality of 
the premise categories in argument (OSWLS-4). 
Although inductive reasoning is uncertain by nature, the 13 phenomena 
documented by Osherson and colleagues represent a rich set of regularities that 
should be accounted for by any adequate theory of category-based induction. 
According to Osherson et al.’s (1990) model, the inductive strength of an 
argument depends on two variables:  
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1. the degree to which the premise categories resemble the conclusion 
category, and  
2. the degree to which the premise categories resemble members of the 
lowest-level category that includes both the premise and conclusion 
categories.  
To illustrate the role of these two variables, the authors use the following 
argument: 
 
 Robins use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
 Bluejays use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
 ———————————————————— 
 Geese use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
 
Notice that, in the foregoing argument, the premise categories are ROBIN and 
BLUEJAY, and the conclusion category is GOOSE; also notice that BIRD is the 
lowest-level category that includes ROBIN, BLUEJAY, and GOOSE. So, the first 
variable corresponds to the similarity between robins and bluejays on the one 
hand, and geese on the other hand; the second variable corresponds to the 
similarity between robins and bluejays on the one hand, and all birds on the 
other hand. In other words, the first variable measures the similarity between 
the premise categories and the conclusion category; the second variable 
measures how well the premise categories ‘cover’ the superordinate category 
that includes all the categories mentioned in an argument. The name Similarity-
coverage model that Osherson et al. (1990) gave to their model summarizes well 
the role of both variables: similarity and coverage. 
 In mathematical terms, the similarity-coverage model uses the following 
simple formula to predict the inductive strength of argument , … ,  / : 
 
 P = SIMRCAT, … , CAT; CATW M  
 1 > P = SIMCAT, … , CAT; XCAT, … , CAT, CATY, 
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where SIMRCAT, … , CAT; CATW indicates the similarity between the 
premise categories and the conclusion category, and XCAT, … ,CAT, CATY denotes the lowest-level category that includes 
both the premise and the conclusion categories. 
Given plausible assumption about the similarity function SIM, the model 
predicts all the 13 phenomena analyzed by Osherson et al (1990). However, a 
general weakness of the similarity-coverage model is due to the fact that 
similarity is a rather vague and elusive notion. Maintaining that two objects are 
similar might be meaningless if a criterion for similarity has not been specified.  
Instead of grounding a model on similarity judgments, an alternative is to 
move towards models in which the focus is on object features. Such models can 
learn directly from experience. 
 
FEATURE-BASED MODELS 
The feature-based model of Sloman (1993) predicts inductive strength as a 
measure of feature overlap between premises and conclusion categories. Like 
the similarity-coverage model, the feature-based model applies to arguments in 
which premises and conclusion have the form “all members of  have property ”. Moreover, Sloman’s (1993) model mainly focuses on “blank” predicates 
about which people would have few prior beliefs.  
 The feature-based model is implemented as a connectionist network in 
which a set of input nodes serves to encode features values, and an output node 
serves to encode the blank predicate . To illustrate the process by which the 
model determines inductive strength, Sloman (1993) considers the following 
argument: 
 
 Robins have property  
 ———————————  (S) 
 Falcons have property  
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The temporal evolution of the connectionist network for the argument (S) is 
shown in Figure 1.1. Before the presentation of the argument, the node 
representing the blank predicate is initially not connected to any nodes that 
represent the features of the premise category (Figure 1.1-a). Then, to encode 
the premise, the input nodes that represent the features of ROBIN are connected 
to the predicate node . In this way, the input nodes ‘activate’ the predicate node 
(Figure 1.1-b). Finally, argument’s conclusion is tested by evaluating the extent 
to which the predicate node  becomes activated by means of the features of the 
conclusion category (Figure 1.1-c). 
  
Figure 1.1: Temporal evolution of the network implemented in 
the feature-based model for the argument (S) 
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In brief, the model’s predictions are completely determined by a set of features 
and by two rules: an encoding rule and an activation rule. The encoding rule 
posits how connections are established between featural and predicate nodes, 
whereas the activation rule defines the value of predicate node. In other terms, 
the encoding rule allows the connectionist network to learn associations 
between input nodes and output node. Then the activation rule serves to 
measure what value is assigned to the output node after presenting the features 
of the conclusion category. If this value is high, then the argument in question is 
judged strong; if it is low, then the argument is judged weak. 
As highlighted by Sloman (1993) himself, according to the feature-based 
model, “argument strength is, roughly, the proportion of features in the conclusion 
category that are also in the premise categories”. And “intuitively, an argument 
seems strong to the extent that premise category features ‘cover’ the features of the 
conclusion category, although the present notion of coverage is substantially 
different from that embodied by the similarity-coverage model” (p. 242). 
Perhaps the most important difference between the feature-based model 
and the similarity-coverage model is that the former does not have a specific 
component for assessing coverage of a superordinate category. In fact, the 
feature-based model is able to address many of the same phenomena as the 
similarity-coverage model, but without employing a second mechanism apt to 
coverage. Another difference between the two models is that only Osherson et 
al.’s (1990) model assumes that judgments of inductive strength depend on a 
stable hierarchical category structure. By contrast, the feature-based model 
assumes that inductive strength depends on the intensity of connection between 
the features of the conclusion category and the predicate in exam. Here, the 
existence of a stable category structure is not necessary. Obviously, Sloman 
(1993) recognizes that people have some knowledge about the hierarchical 
structure of categories. However, in his model, this knowledge is not 
represented as structured as would be required to support Osherson et al.’s 
(1990) model. 
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 Both the similarity-coverage model and feature-based model make 
accurate predictions of the inductive strength of arguments whose predicates 
are blank. Yet, as noted by Heit (1998), inductive reasoning with blank 
properties captures only one aspect of inductive reasoning in general. 
 
BAYESIAN MODELS 
 Heit (1998) proposed a more extensive framework for addressing 
phenomena besides similarity, diversity, and typicality effects. He has presented 
a theory where induction is modeled as Bayesian inference. Hence, the name of 
his model: Bayesian model.  
To illustrate the model, Heit (1998) discusses the following inductive 
argument involving just two categories of animals, namely, cows and horses: 
 
Cows have property  
——————————  (H) 
Horses have property  
 
The author argues that, when reasoning about novel properties to be attributed 
to cows and/or horses, it is convenient to classify all the known properties 
concerning animals into four groups:  
1. properties that are true of cows and horses; 
2. properties that are true of cows but not horses; 
3. properties that are true of horses but not cows; 
4. properties that are not true of either cows or horses. 
These four types of known properties are thought of as four alternative 
hypotheses, each associated with a degree of prior belief. Table 1.3 reports the 
degree of prior belief that Heit proposes for each of the four hypotheses. 
The value of 0.70 assigned to hypothesis 1 indicates that there is a 70% 
chance that a new property would be true of both cows and horses. Heit (1998) 
observes that the prior beliefs sum up to 1, since the corresponding hypotheses 
are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.  
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Table 1.3: The four hypotheses and the degree of prior beliefs 
used in Heit’s (1998) example 
 
Hypotheses Degree of prior belief 
1 Cow = True and Horse = True 0.70 
2 Cow = True and Horse = False 0.05 
3 Cow = False and Horse = True 0.05 
4 Cow = False and Horse = False 0.20 
 
Once the prior beliefs are assigned, the next step planned in the Bayesian model 
is to update the belief values in light of new evidence. As for argument (H) above, 
the prior beliefs concerning the four hypotheses need to be updated in light of 
the premise “Cows have property ”. To compute the posterior degree of belief 
in each hypothesis, Bayes’s theorem is used and the values obtained are 0.93 for 
hypothesis 1, 0.07 for hypothesis 2, and 0 for the remaining hypotheses 3 and 4. 
At this point, Heit (1998) argues that the previous values may be used to assess 
the plausibility of the argument’s conclusion. Indeed, by virtue of the total 
probability theorem, the degree of belief that horses have property  is directly 
given by summing the updated beliefs in hypotheses 1 and 3, namely, the values 
0.93 and 0.  
Heit (1998) observes that, before learning that cows have the property , 
the prior belief that horses have the property  is only 0.75 = 0.70 + 0.05. Thus, 
according to the model, the premise that cows have the property  leads to an 
increase in the belief that horses have the property . However, in Heit’s (1998) 
Bayesian model the inductive strength of an argument is not measured as a 
function of the increase in the plausibility of its conclusion. Inductive strength is 
simply given by the updated plausibility of the argument’s conclusion. 
 It is worth noticing that the Bayesian model is strictly linked to accounts 
of hypothesis testing and, as such, it suggests a normative description on how to 
reason with a hypothesis space. This account is rather successful as it is able to 
accommodate most of the psychological phenomena as Osherson et al.’s (1990) 
and Sloman’s (1993) models. On the Bayesian model account, assessing the 
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strength of an inductive argument is regarded as learning about the property 
appearing in the premises and conclusion of that argument. For example, upon 
learning that dogs have some novel property , one might wonder whether 
wolves or parrots have the same property . The key assumption of the Bayesian 
model is that, to answer this question, people would analyze a set of hypotheses 
about the novel property, relying on prior knowledge about familiar properties. 
For instance, the fact that people know a relatively large number of properties 
true of both dogs and wolves may lead to the conclusion that, if property  is 
applied to dogs, then it probably applies to wolves too. On the other hand, a 
relatively small number of properties are known to be true of both dogs and 
parrots, and this may lead to conclude that property  is relatively unlikely to 
extend to parrots. 
The foregoing example is consistent with the principle that similarity 
promotes property projection. Given the premise that a category has a certain 
property, it seems plausible that a similar category has that property as well. 
But, for some properties and some categories, similarity does not seem to be 
central to inductive inferences. Heit and Rubinstein (1994) have provided the 
following important example showing how inferences may go in the opposite 
direction of what overall similarity would predict. 
 
 Chickens prefer to feed at night 
 ——————————————  (HR-1) 
 Hawks prefer to feed at night 
 
 Tigers prefer to feed at night 
 —————————————  (HR-2) 
 Hawks prefer to feed at night 
 
Heit and Rubinstein (1994) found that the argument (HR-1) is judged weaker 
than the argument (HR-2). But, if the behavioral property about feeding and 
predation is replaced with the blank, biological property “have a liver with two 
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chambers”, then the standard trend predicted by the similarity-coverage model 
re-emerges. Despite the considerable biological differences between tigers and 
hawks, it seems that people are influenced by the known predatory behavior 
that these two animals have in common. 
Another example in which similarity seems not to be central to induction 
has been provided by Smith, Shafir, & Osherson (1993). 
 
Poodles can bite through barbed wire 
 ——————————————————————  (SSO-1) 
 German Shepherds can bite through barbed wire 
 
 Dobermans can bite through barbed wire 
 ——————————————————————  (SSO-2) 
 German Shepherds can bite through barbed wire 
 
Smith et al. (1993) found that the argument (SSO-1) is stronger than the 
argument (SSO-2), even though there is greater similarity between Dobermans 
and German Shepherds than between poodles and German Shepherds. An 
informal justification given to this result is based on the preconditions for the 
capacity to bite through barbed wire: if a little and weak dog, like a poodle, is 
able to bite through barbed wire, then clearly a German Shepherd, which is 
stronger and more ferocious, can do so as well. 
 Heit (1998) shows how his Bayesian model can account for effects (e.g., 
those presented in the previous two examples) that are determined by 
properties rather than by the similarity between categories. The distribution of 
prior beliefs across hypotheses is of extreme importance to predict these effects. 
But how are these prior beliefs generated? According to Heit, prior beliefs are 
assigned on the basis of past observations. His explanation for how prior beliefs 
come about is heavily memory-based: the probability of a hypothesis is 
proportional to the number of familiar features that can be retrieved from 
memory and that have the same extension as that hypothesis. 
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 Tenenbaum et al. (2007) acknowledge that, if supplied with the right 
kinds of prior beliefs, Heit’s (1998) Bayesian model is able to predict a number 
of qualitative phenomena concerning both blank and non-blank properties. 
However, Tenenbaum et al. (2007) point out the lack of a formal method for 
generating priors, as well as the lack of any quantitative test for checking the 
accuracy of the model through people’s judgments. 
 
THEORY-BASED BAYESIAN MODELS  
Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp (2006) have proposed a framework that adopts a 
Bayesian approach which is similar to that implemented by Heit (1998). The 
Bayesian approach of Tenenbaum et al. (2006) attempts to answer two 
important kinds of question about human inductive capacities. First, what 
knowledge is a given inductive inference based on? And second, how does that 
knowledge support property generalization? In contrast with previous models of 
inductive reasoning, in which the emphasis is put mainly on the process of 
induction, the approach developed by Tenenbaum et al. (2006) takes the prior 
knowledge representation as a crucial element. A major distinction between the 
Bayesian model of Heit (1998) and the theory-based Bayesian framework of 
Tenenbaum et al. (2006) is the presence, in the second framework, of a 
mechanism that generates appropriate prior beliefs. 
The framework proposed by Tenenbaum at al. has two main components: 
a structured probabilistic representation of domain-specific knowledge, and a 
general Bayesian inference engine to perform inductive inferences. Even though 
structured representations are far from being complete formalizations of 
people’s knowledge, they are important because they approximate the genuine 
structures contained in the world. On the other hand, Bayesian inference 
provides a well-grounded normative procedure for uncertain reasoning. 
Together, the two components lead to quantitative models for predicting 
people’s inductive judgments. More importantly, the two components offer an 
explanation about the processes underlying inductive reasoning.  
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It has been argued that different properties, such as anatomical features, 
behavioral properties, or disease states of animal species, might promote 
different patterns of inductive behavior. But whether this is due to diverse kinds 
of knowledge, diverse mechanisms of reasoning, or both, is not so clear. 
According to Tenenbaum et al. (2007), a single Bayesian mechanism, in which 
the priors are generated to capture most of the knowledge that supports 
induction, may be sufficient. 
It is challenging to adequately model prior beliefs concerning any familiar 
thing, because different kinds of knowledge might be relevant when making 
inferences about the thing in question. For example, a cat can be thought about 
in a large number of ways. It is an animal that belongs to the category of felines, 
eats mice, climbs trees, has whiskers, and so on. As pointed out by Tenenbaum et 
al. (2007), all of these pieces of information could be influential in an inductive 
inference about cats. For instance, upon learning that cats suffer from a recently 
discovered disease, people could suspect that mice have that disease too. Or, 
upon learning that cats have a recently discovered gene, people could think that 
tigers are more likely to have that gene than mice. Thus, as mentioned earlier, it 
seems clear that inductive inferences crucially depend on the property involved. 
The theory-based Bayesian models of Tenenbaum et al. (2006), as well as the 
Bayesian model of Heit (1998), accounts for property-based phenomena by 
positing that people can rely on different kinds of prior knowledge.  
For Tenenbaum et al. (2006) any computational theory on inductive 
reasoning should show as explicitly as possible how priors are generated in a 
specific context. As regards the theory-based Bayesian framework, two aspects 
are most relevant for constructing priors: firstly, a representation of how 
categories are related to each other and, secondly, a process that governs how 
properties are distributed over categories. In this framework, each category is 
represented as a node in a relational structure. The structure’s edges represent 
relations that are relevant for determining inductive strength (e.g., taxonomical 
or causal relations). Priors are then generated by means of a stochastic process 
defined over the relational structure. Stochastic processes, such as diffusion 
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process, drift process, or noisy-transmission process, can be used to model how 
properties are distributed over the related categories.  
The theory-based Bayesian framework of Tenenbaum et al. (2006) is able 
to capture several kinds of knowledge by choosing the appropriate kind of 
structure and the appropriate stochastic process. However, an important 
constraint in the construction of priors is given by the correspondence, albeit not 
perfect, between the structure of the world and the representation of the 
Bayesian model. To illustrate, the theory-based Bayesian model developed for 
generic biological properties uses a noisy-mutation process over a taxonomic 
tree. The theory-based Bayesian model developed for causally transmitted 
properties, instead, uses a noisy-transmission process over a predator-prey 
network. Both models are built by thinking about how some class of properties 
is actually distributed in the world. Not surprisingly, they correspond roughly to 
models employed by biologists and epidemiologists, respectively. According to 
Tenenbaum et al. (2006), by deriving prior beliefs from ‘intuitive theories’ (e.g., 
intuitive biology, intuitive physics, intuitive psychology) that reflect the actual 
structure of the world, it becomes clear why these priors should support 
induction in real-world tasks. It is worthwhile to note that the theory-based 
approach uses the same Bayesian principle to explain how intuitive theories 
guide inductive inferences, but also how intuitive theories might be learned from 
experience. 
Both the model for generic biological properties and the model for 
causally transmitted properties have been tested. In doing so, judgments of 
inductive strength expressed by participants have been compared with 
theoretical judgments predicted by the models. In addition, a comparison with 
several alternative models, including the similarity-coverage model, has been 
performed (see Tenenbaum et al., 2007). In general, the theory-based Bayesian 
model that is specific for the inductive context in exam has given better 
predictions than, or comparable to, the best of the other models. 
As pointed out by Sloman (2007), the sophisticated framework proposed 
by Tenenbaum et al. (2006) is impressive in its potential for generating domain-
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specific models. The strength of this approach is that it offers a perspective 
covering induction in all its forms. However, the danger is that a large number of 
relational structures need to be created, each shaped to fit a specific study. Yet, it 
is plausible to think that relational structures are not independent of each other. 
Presumably, all rational structures are generated on the basis of some 
fundamental principles. For example, a top-down biological structure might 
emerge from a causal analysis grounded on an evolutionary base. In fact, it might 
be the case that, once the causal analysis that endorses the hierarchical structure 
is clearly defined, the structure itself will turn out to be unnecessary. In this 
sense, inductions might be mediated directly by causal knowledge. In other 
words, the relational structure may serve as a proxy for some other kind of 
knowledge, like causal knowledge, that is not domain specific. This last view was 
largely supported by Rehder (2007). 
 
INDUCTIVE REASONING REVISITED AS CAUSAL REASONING  
Rehder (2007) interprets property generalization in terms of causal reasoning. 
He reports numerous sources of evidence that people reason causally when they 
generalize properties. For example, he mentions the results of Heit and 
Rubinstein (1994) showing that a behavioral property (e.g., “travel in a zig-zag 
path”) is projected more strongly from tunas to whales than from bears to 
whales. But when the property in exam is biological (e.g., “have a liver with two 
chambers”), then a reversal trend is observed, that is the property is generalized 
more strongly from bears to whales than from tunas to whales. Rehder’s reading 
of these results is that people recognize the biological similarity between bears 
and whales because of a causal mechanism associated with their common 
category, namely, MAMMAL. Probably this mechanism gives rise to biological 
properties like having a two-chambers liver. On the other hand, people think 
that tunas and whales are more likely to share a behavioral property like 
traveling in a zig-zag path, because tunas and whales are prey/predator animals 
living in the same natural environment.  
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 Also the results of Smith et al. (1993), already illustrated above, are 
interpreted by Rehder in terms of causal reasoning. Smith et al. (1993) found 
that people are more willing to generalize the property “can bite through barbed 
wire” to German Shepherds from poodles than from Dobermans. In this case, the 
kind of causal reasoning that drives people’s judgment is more or less the 
following: if poodles can bite through barbed wire, then obviously stronger dogs 
like German Shepherds can do it too. But it could not be the case if the premise 
category is another powerful dog. 
 Finally, another example used by Rehder in support of the centrality of 
causal reasoning in property generalization is due to Sloman. Sloman (1994) 
considers the following pair of arguments: 
 
 Many ex-cons are hired as bodyguards 
 ———————————————————  (S-1) 
 Many war veterans are hired as bodyguards 
 
Many ex-cons are unemployed 
 ————————————————  (S-2) 
 Many war veterans are unemployed 
 
According to Sloman’s (1994) results, the argument (S-1) is judged stronger than 
the argument (S-2). Rehder’s explanation is that, in the first argument, the same 
reasons that lead to be a good bodyguard (e.g., being experienced fighter) can be 
applied to both ex-cons and war veterans. By contrast, the reasons that explain 
unemployment of war veterans are less likely to be applied to ex-cons too. 
 Rehder (2006) has developed a general theory that underlines the 
centrality of causal reasoning in induction. This theory makes three predictions 
about the role of causal reasoning in category-based generalizations. The first 
prediction is that property generalization can reflect prospective reasoning. 
According to this prediction, the more the causes producing a property are 
present in the conclusion category, the more the property is generalizable. The 
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second prediction is that property generalization can be driven by a diagnostic 
reasoning. The more the presence of a property can be inferred by the effects it 
might produce, the more the property is generalizable. To put it differently, 
property generalization can be thought of as a particular kind of causal 
reasoning in which people make a diagnosis about the presence of a property by 
analyzing whether its symptoms (i.e., effects) are present or not. The third 
prediction is that property generalizations are regulated by extensional 
reasoning. The more the causes and/or effects of a property are prevalent, the 
more the property is generalizable.  
The previously discussed results of Heit and Rubinstein (1994), Smith et 
al. (1993), and Sloman (1994) can be seen as empirical support for the 
prospective-reasoning prediction (for other empirical data in support of 
Rehder’s theory, see Rehder, 2006).  
An important question concerns how causal knowledge interacts with the 
phenomena formalized by the similarity-coverage model, such as diversity, 
similarity, and typicality. To foreshadow the main result, research suggests that 
causal reasoning not only influences property generalizations, but, in some 
cases, it may replace the similarity-based effects. For example, Lopez, Atran, 
Coley, Medin & Smith (1997) found that Itzaj Maya, a population in the rainforest 
of Guatemala with great expertise regarding local plants and animals, often 
based their inferences (e.g., about the disease in a species) on causal processes, 
thus failing to show standard diversity effects. By contrast, American 
undergraduates did show standard diversity effects on the same items. 
 Of course, the foregoing results could be explained in terms of cultural 
differences between Itzaj and Americans. However, the prevalence of causal 
explanations does not seem to be attributable only to cultural factors. Proffitt, 
Coley, & Medin (2000) studied inferences about plant categories made by three 
groups of American tree experts: taxonomists, landscapers, and tree 
maintenance workers. The aim was to test whether and how property 
generalizations are influenced by typicality and diversity effects. Like Itzaj Maya, 
the landscapers and the tree maintenance workers did not show standard 
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diversity effects. Moreover, none of the groups of tree experts exhibited 
standard typicality effects.  
The studies of Lopez et al. (1997) and Proffitt et al. (2000) tested experts 
with domain-specific knowledge, but there is also evidence, coming from non-
expert people, that proves a similar pattern. Consider the following pair of 
arguments proposed by Medin, Coley, Storms & Hayes (2003):  
 
Pigs are injected with antibiotics 
Chickens are injected with antibiotics 
————————————————  (MCSH-1) 
Cobras are injected with antibiotics 
 
Pigs are injected with antibiotics 
Whales are injected with antibiotics 
————————————————  (MCSH-2) 
Cobras are injected with antibiotics 
 
Medin et al. (2003) found that American undergraduates judged the argument 
(MCSH-1) weaker than the argument (MCSH-2), despite the set of premise 
categories is more diverse in the first argument than in the second one. Maybe, 
pigs and chickens were recognized as farm animals, and this suggested possible 
causes of being injected with antibiotics. The fact that those causes are absent in 
cobras may have led to a weaker property generalization. 
 To deepen the study on how causal knowledge interacts with typicality, 
diversity, and similarity effects, Rehder (2006) conducted three experiments in 
which the causal knowledge was explicitly provided to participants (observe 
that in the studies of Lopez et al., 1997; Proffitt et al., 2000; and Medin et al., 
2003 participants’ judgments relied on background knowledge). In each 
experiment two factors were manipulated. One factor was the presence/absence 
of a causal explanation; the other factor was either diversity, similarity, or 
typicality. The results suggest that, if a causal explanation is available, then 
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typicality, similarity, and diversity effects can be reduced or completely 
eliminated.  
 
AVAILABILITY AS A KEY FACTOR TO EXPLAIN CATEGORY-BASED INDUCTION 
 The concept of availability is central for Shafto, Coley, and Vitkin (2007). 
These authors, too, recognize that many kinds of knowledge can support 
inductive reasoning, and that a specific knowledge would be employed in a given 
particular situation. For example, taxonomic knowledge would be preferred 
when reasoning about a novel property concerning internal features such as 
two-chambered liver; ecological knowledge would be preferred, instead, when 
reasoning about toxins or diseases that might spread through an ecosystem. But 
what are the factors that influence the selection of a particular knowledge in a 
given situation? Shafto et al. (2007) argue that different kinds of knowledge are 
differentially available across contexts, and that the ease with which specific 
knowledge comes to mind reflects the probability that such knowledge will 
guide inductive inference. 
 According to Shafto et al.’s (2007) view, availability is a dynamic concept: 
it may change. The main sources determining changes in the availability of 
different kinds of knowledge are short-term influences of context and long-term 
effects of experience. On one hand, the context characterizing category-based 
induction tasks (e.g., the set of categories and the property used) results in acute 
changes in availability. On the other hand, prior knowledge accrued through 
experience results in chronic changes in availability. 
Shafto et al. (2007) reconsider evidence coming from experimental 
results in psychological literature, and they reinterpret existing phenomena in 
light of changes in availability. As will be seen, these changes are due to both 
inductive context and experience in a specific domain. As regards inductive 
context, the results obtained by Heit and Rubinstein (1994), which highlight the 
importance of property in induction, are explained as follows: the given property 
to be generalized makes the specific knowledge that drives inductive inference 
more available. Thus, in general, anatomical knowledge is more available when 
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anatomical properties are given, and likewise behavioral knowledge is more 
available if behavioral properties are provided. 
Another line of evidence, showing how context may change availability, 
concerns the effects of relations among premise categories, or among premise 
and conclusion categories. Work by Medin, Coley, Storms & Hayes (2003) has 
identified a number of effects, termed relevance effects, that demonstrate how 
salient relations among premises categories, or between premises and 
conclusion categories, may direct the assessment of inductive strength. One of 
these effects is non-diversity via property reinforcement. To illustrate, consider 
the following pair of arguments: 
 
 Polar bears have property  
 Antelopes have property  
 —————————————  (MCSH-1) 
 All animals have property  
 
 Polar bears have property  
 Penguins have property  
 —————————————  (MCSH-2) 
 All animals have property  
 
Medin et al. (2003) found that arguments like (MCSH-1) are rated stronger than 
arguments like (MCSH-2), even though, on a taxonomic account, the premises in 
the second argument offer better coverage of the conclusion category than the 
premises in the first argument. It seems that the salient property shared by polar 
bears and penguins – adaptation to a freezing environment – interferes with the 
greater coverage they provide to ANIMAL category. 
A second effect analyzed by Medin et al. (2003) is non-monotonicity via 
property reinforcement. Consider the following two arguments: 
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 Brown bears have property  
—————————————  (MCSH-3) 
 Buffalo have property  
 
 Brown bears have property  
Polar bears have property  
Black bears have property  
Grizzly bears have property  
—————————————  (MCSH-4) 
 Buffalo have property  
 
By virtue of the monotonicity phenomenon (see Osherson et al., 1990), the 
argument (MCSH-4) should be stronger than the argument (MCSH-3). However, 
Medin et al. (2003) found an opposite trend. A possible explanation is that the 
premises in the argument (MCSH-4) seem to reinforce the idea that property  is 
involved with bears, and therefore the property is unlikely to be true of buffalo. 
Shafto et al. (2007) reinterpret the relevance effects reported by Medin et 
al. (2003) as follows: if specific relations among premises and/or conclusions 
categories are available (e.g., being polar animals or bears), then more general 
phenomena are overcome (e.g., diversity or monotonicity effects).  
The results examined so far are all explained in terms of acute changes in 
availability due to factors that outline inductive context: the nature of property 
and the relations between categories in an argument. Shafto et al. (2007) also 
present evidence that the availability of different kinds of knowledge can be 
mediated by experience in a specific domain. For example, evidence in this 
direction comes from the results of Lopez et al. (1997), and Proffitt et al. (2000), 
which reveal that novices and experts rely on different kinds of knowledge when 
making inductive inferences. It is worth noticing that Rehder (2007) used the 
same results – Lopez et al. (1997) and Proffitt et al.’s (2000) results – to prove 
how causal reasoning may guide induction. By contrast, Shafto et al. (2007) use 
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those results to show that experiential background may lead to chronic changes 
in the kinds of knowledge that are available for inductive reasoning. 
In sum, Shafto et al. (2007) maintain that the notion of availability 
provides a framework which is able to connect a large number of phenomena 
related to category-based induction. This framework can explain the effects of 
properties on inductive reasoning, and can also account for the influence of 
experience in property generalizations.  
 
  
45 
 
 
 
Chapter 2  
In case of uncertain evidence 
 
2.1 The role of uncertainty in everyday life: a psychological 
perspective 
 
Uncertainty in everyday life is often understood as a part of some underlying, 
causal structure of the world that people strive to comprehend. According to 
Hastie and Dawes (2001), people tend to deny the existence of chance. Or, even 
worse, people tend to conceive some rationale to explain life’s uncertainties. 
Sometimes, the consequences of denying uncertainty and believing in a 
deterministic world can be very severe. Some individuals think that poor people, 
living on the street, must have done something to deserve that fate. And these 
poor people themselves may accept that judgment. In such a situation, assistance 
measures are rendered ineffective.  
Even those who have studied the theory of probability calculus are 
inclined to erroneously interpret the behavior of random processes unless they 
are asked to corroborate their interpretations. A typical misconception about 
randomness is to believe that some kinds of chance events, such as winning the 
lottery, involve skills. This misconception is caused by the fact that, in such 
events, there is an element of active participation. For instance, we have to 
choose a lottery ticket, if we want a chance of winning. Choosing the right ticket 
is often seen as a special ability. But, of course, this reading is not correct. It may 
lead to an illusion of personal control over situations that are governed solely by 
chance. 
According to Hastie and Dawes (2001), it is very easy to confuse factors 
depending on chance with factors based on skill. When evaluating the outcomes 
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of actions that involve both chance and skill (e.g., making a goal in a football 
match), people have a strong propensity to repeat behaviors that precede 
success and change behaviors that precede failure. Such a strategy encourages 
superstitious behaviors. Superstitions, as well as beliefs in tarot cards and 
astrology, help many people to make sense of uncertainty in life.  
It is not pathological to try to reduce uncertainty regarding our existence 
and the environment around us. Uncertainty reduction is essential to the 
cognitive enterprise of understanding the world. It is fundamental even in 
science. However, a complete removal of uncertainty would be dreadful. 
 In Prometheus Bound, Aeschylus writes: 
 
Prometheus: 
I caused mortals to cease foreseeing their doom. 
Chorus: 
Of what sort was the cure that you found for this affliction? 
Prometheus: 
I caused blind hopes to dwell within their breasts. 
Chorus: 
A great benefit was this you gave to mortals. 
(Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, vv.250-253, Smyth, 1926) 
 
According to Aeschylus, hope comes from the lack of certainty of doom. Hope is 
blind. A life without uncertainty would be unbearable: no hope, no challenge, no 
freedom.  
Imagine the horror of being informed to have a gene that causes 
Alzheimer’s disease with certainty. But being informed about pleasant news 
with certainty would also detract from life’s happiness. It is only because people 
do not know what the future holds for them that they can have hope. It is only 
because people are unaware of the exact consequences of their choices that 
choice can be free, within the limits of morality.  
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Most people recognize that there is a lot of uncertainty in the world. A 
very critical choice is whether to accept that uncertainty or try to avoid it. Those 
who choose to reject uncertainty, or those who believe uncertainty does not 
exist, live in a stable, deterministic world, which is constructed, invented, not 
real. By contrast, those who accept uncertainty can appreciate the limits of 
knowledge. A central part of wisdom is the capacity to establish what is 
uncertain, and comprehend the probabilistic essence of uncertainty in real 
contexts. 
Both in the epistemological and psychological domain, uncertainty is 
normally expressed and formalized in terms of probabilities. It is usual to assign 
a different degree of uncertainty, i.e., a different probabilistic value, to 
alternative hypotheses under examination. Yet, in epistemological and 
psychological research, much less attention has been paid to another kind of 
uncertainty, which is likewise central: the uncertainty relative to a piece of 
evidence.  
In the following section, I will show how classical Bayesian 
conditionalitazion can be extended in order to account for situations where a 
piece of evidence is not certain. 
 
 
2.2  On Jeffrey’s rule 
 
Jeffrey conditionalization represents a formal means to update degrees of belief 
on the basis of uncertain evidence. In what follows, I will illustrate Jeffrey’s rule 
in some details.  
Consider a non-empty set of propositions Γ closed under negation, 
conjunction and disjunction, and consider a probability function Z defined, at a 
given time [, over Γ. Suppose that O is a set of mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive events, with O  Γ and ZO 0 0 for all \. Jeffrey (1965) has given 
the following definition to introduce his conditionalization: 
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Definition 2.1: A probability measure ] is said to come from Z, by 
probability kinematics on O, if there exists a sequence ^O of positive real 
numbers summing to one, such that 
 
 ] ! ∑ Z|O = ^OO ,  for all   Γ.                                                       (2.1) 
 
Observe that, if the set O is comprised by only one proposition , then the 
formula (2.1) reduces to the following: 
 
 ] ! Z|,  for all   Γ.                                                                    (2.2) 
 
Thus, probability kinematics turns out to be a generalization of classical 
Bayesian conditionalization. As Wagner (2002) points out, the formula (2.1) is 
equivalent to the conjunction of two conditions: 
 
 ]O ! ^O ,                       for all \, and                                                              (2.3) 
 ]|O ! Z|O,  for all   Γ and for all \.                                       (2.4) 
  
Put into words, probability kinematics provides a tool to revise a probability 
function when the total evidence induces a revision of the probabilities of O – as 
specified by (2.3) – and when nothing new is learned about the relevance of any O to every proposition  – as specified by (2.4). It is worth noting that the 
probabilities ]O are based not only on new evidence, but also on old 
evidence. 
Although Jeffrey conditionalization appears in many respects to be the 
most appropriate generalization of Bayesian conditionalization, many authors 
have objected that Jeffrey conditionalization is defective, for it is non-
commutative. This means that consecutive applications of Jeffrey 
conditionalization may produce different ultimate results, depending upon the 
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order in which those conditionalizations are applied. For example, having 
revised Z to ] by the formula (2.1), consider a subsequent revision of ] to `  by an analogous formula: 
 `  ! ∑ ]R|abW = cbb ,  for all   Γ,                                                       (2.5) 
 
where dabe and RcbW have the same functions as the previous O and ^O. Now 
imagine reversing the order of the revisions, so that Z is first revised to ]f by 
means of dabe and RcbW, and then ]f is revised to `f by means of O and ^O. It 
may be the case that ` g `f, unless O =  and dabe = a. Under classical 
Bayesian conditionalization, in fact, `  ! Z|  a ! Z|a   !`f.  
In what follows, I will discuss a numerical example, due to Lange (2000), 
showing the non-commutativity of Jeffrey’s rule. Imagine seeing a bird at 
twilight, and imagine identifying it to be a raven. Consider the following 
propositions: 
  ! “All ravens are black”,  ! a ! “The bird observed is black”. 
 
Because of the darkness, it is difficult to identify the bird’s color with certainty. 
So suppose that the observation made at twilight can only raise the confidence in  from Z ! 0.75 to ] ! 0.99. Suppose, moreover, that initially Z   ! 0.7 and Z   ! 0, so that Z ! 0.7. According to 
Jeffrey conditionalization, ] ! @ l.ml.mnE = 0.99 M @ ll.nE = 0.01 ! 0.924. In 
particular, it results that ]   ! 0.924 and ]   ! 0. Now, 
suppose that a second glance lowers the confidence in , so that `  ! 0.8. A 
second application of Jeffrey’s rule yields `  r 0.747.  
If, instead, the two experiences occur in a reversed order, namely, ]f ! 0.8 and `f ! 0.99, then ]f r 0.747 and `f ! 0.924. The 
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main steps in the two cases are summarized in the following sequences of 
revisions. 
  Z ! 0.7 > > > ] ! 0.924 > > > `  r 0.747Z ! 0.75 ] ! 0.99 `  ! 0.8  
(2.6) 
 Z ! 0.7 > > > ]f r 0.747 > > > `f ! 0.924Z ! 0.75 ]f ! 0.8 `f ! 0.99  
(2.7) 
 
In both sequences, the second glance completely overrides the first glance. Thus, 
apparently, commutativity is not respected: `  g `f. 
The possibility of such non-commutativity has caused much concern 
among several epistemologists. Van Fraassen (1989) writes about this issue: 
 
Two persons, who have the same relevant experiences on the 
same day, but in a different order, will not agree in the 
evening even if they had exactly the same opinions in the 
morning. Does this not make nonsense of the idea of learning 
from experience?  
(van Fraassen, 1989, p. 338) 
 
Following Lange (2000), I will argue that Jeffrey conditionalization has been 
deemed inadequate on the basis of unjustified concern. Returning to the 
foregoing example, the fact that two persons assign probability values to  in a 
reversed order does not mean that those persons have identical learning from 
the same relevant experiences. Observe that the last step in the sequence (2.6) 
and the first step in the sequence (2.7) are both induced by experiences 
prompting a revision of the belief in , with the effect of setting  ! 0.8. Yet, 
these experiences are not the same. The main reason is that the degree of 
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confidence in , directly prompted by an experience, depends on agent’s prior 
opinions. In order to explain this, Lange writes:  
 
For an experience at twilight to have lowered our confidence 
in E from 0.99 to 0.8, the bird must have not looked much the 
way a black bird would be expected to look at twilight, 
whereas for an experience at twilight to have raised our 
confidence in E from 0.75 to 0.8, the bird must have looked 
about the way that any dusky colored object would be 
expected to look under those conditions. Plainly, these are 
different experiences. 
(Lange, 2000, p. 398) 
 
Though Jeffrey’s rule may give different ultimate outcomes depending on the 
order in which probability values are plugged in, this does not prove its non-
commutativity. Indeed, the raven example does not show that Jeffrey 
conditionalization leads to different final opinions, starting from the same priors 
and the same experiences.  
 According to Wagner (2002), the concern about the non-commutativity of 
Jeffrey’s rule seems to rely on implicit acceptance of the following two 
principles: 
 
Principle 1: If the experience inducing the revision of Z to ] and the 
experience inducing the revision of ]f to `f produce the same learning, 
and if the experiences inducing the revision of ] to `  and the 
experience inducing the revision of Z to ]f produce the same learning, 
then it ought to be the case that ` ! `f. 
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Principle 2: Identical learning deriving from the revision of Z to ] 
and of ]f to `f ought to be expressed by the probability identities 
 
  `fO ! ]O,  for all \,                                                                    (2.8) 
 
and identical learning deriving from the revision of ] to `  and of Z 
to ]f ought to be expressed by the identities 
 
  ]fRabW ! ` RabW,  for all s.                                                                    (2.9) 
 
While Principle 1 is wholly correct, Principle 2 is erroneous, since probabilities 
assigned to O and ab are based on the total evidence, as already mentioned 
earlier. This is to say, probabilities appearing in the condition (2.3), which 
defines Jeffrey conditionalization, depend not only upon new evidence, but also 
upon old evidence, and thus they incorporate elements of the relevant priors. 
 Within the Bayesian framework, it is possible to represent numerically 
what is learned from new evidence alone. The correct representation is provided 
by the ratios of new-to-old odds (see Good, 1950, 1983). Wagner (2002) proved 
that, if Principle 2 is modified by substituting (2.8) and (2.9) with adequate 
identities involving Bayes factors, then Principle 2 is both sufficient and, in many 
cases, necessary for the satisfaction of Principle 1. Put another way, once 
identical learning is appropriately formalized, Jeffrey’s rule does commute 
across order. 
The theoretical study presented in the following section4 addresses the 
issue of generalizing Bayesian theory of confirmation to cases of evidential 
uncertainty. As will be shown, Jeffrey conditionalization will play an essential 
role. 
 
 
                                               
4 Much of the material in §2.3 appears in Crupi, Festa, & Mastropasqua (2008). 
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2.3 A theoretical study on how to adapt confirmation 
measures in case of evidential uncertainty 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of 
ordinary and scientific reasoning. Also, contemporary Bayesians typically 
endorse a subjective reading of probability, i.e., interpret probabilities as 
degrees of subjective belief. Huber (2005) has provided a novel criticism of 
Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by 
uncertain evidence, i.e., evidence which has not been ascertained. In order to 
assess Huber’s argument, it is crucial to combine Bayesian confirmation theory 
with Jeffrey conditionalization. In the present theoretical study, I will argue that, 
when properly merged with Jeffrey conditionalization, Bayesian confirmation 
theory escapes Huber’s criticism and yields some new and appealing results. 
The discussion will proceed as follows. First, I will outline a generalized 
version of Bayesian confirmation theory which can be readily applied under 
Jeffrey conditionalization. Then, I will review a crucial requirement at the core of 
Huber’s argument and show that it is equivocal. I will argue that on one reading 
it amounts to a compelling principle, whereas on an alternative reading it turns 
out to be highly implausible. Finally, I will show that the proposed account of 
Bayesian confirmation by uncertain evidence appropriately captures the former 
version of the requirement and violates the latter.  
 
2.3.2 Uncertain evidence and Bayesian confirmation 
 
For the purposes of the present study, I will consider a non-empty set of 
statements Γ closed under truth-functional operators such as negation, 
conjunction and disjunction. Bayesians commonly assume that, at a given time [, 
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the belief state of an agent  concerning the statements in Γ is represented by a 
probability function Z defined over that set. 
 It may occur that, from time [ to u,  experiences a change in opinion 
concerning a particular   Γ (provided that Z is not extreme, i.e., 0 5 Z 5 1). Therefore, one important question is: how should ’s beliefs in 
other statements belonging to Γ change as a consequence? 
 Up to the mid-1960s, Bayesians had a ready answer only for the special 
case in which, at time u,  has come to believe that  is certainly true, so that ] ! 1 (and, correspondingly, ] ! 0). ‘Classical’ Bayesian updating 
or conditionalization (BC) postulates that: 
 
If ] ! 1, then for any   Γ, ] ! Z|   (BC) 
 
However, it may surely also occur that ’s degree of belief in  changes from 
time [ to u without reaching certainty. What will be the value of ] then? 
Richard Jeffrey has suggested a natural and elegant way to generalize classical 
Bayesian conditionalization (Jeffrey, 1965, Chapter 11; also see Jeffrey, 2004, pp. 
53-55). In Jeffrey conditionalization (JC), it is assumed that: 
 
For any   Γ, ] ! Z| = ] M Z| = ]     (JC) 
 
Thus, in (JC) ] is computed as an average of the ‘old’ conditional 
probabilities of  on  vs. , weighted by the current probabilities of  and , respectively. Notice that (JC) is obtained directly by the formula (2.1) 
supposing O ! ,  (see §2.2). It is easy to see that Jeffrey 
conditionalization is a proper generalization of classical Bayesian updating in the 
sense that (JC) implies (BC) (not the converse). Under Jeffrey conditionalization, 
however, a change in belief about  prompts the updating of the prior 
probability Z to a new value ] which is generally not identical to 
either the conditional Z| (except when  does become certainly true) or 
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the conditional Z| (except when  becomes certainly false), but rather 
lies between those two values. 
 Now consider the Bayesian notion of confirmation. Bayesian confirmation 
theory has been commonly elaborated and applied on the background of 
classical Bayesian updating. The issue has been to formalize the impact on a 
hypothesis  on the (often implicit, and quite restrictive) assumption of 
evidence  having been ascertained, i.e., precisely in case Z g ] ! 1. 
Then  is said to be confirmed iff ] ! Z| 0 Z and to be 
disconfirmed iff ] ! Z| 5 Z. (If ] ! Z| ! Z, 
it is said that coming to know that  is neutral for .) 
 Can Bayesian confirmation theory be extended to cases such that from 
time [ to u the probability of  changes, but the assumption of  having been 
ascertained at u is relaxed? In other terms, is there any natural way to parallel 
Jeffrey’s generalization of classical Bayesian updating in the framework of 
confirmation, and provide a plausible probabilistic account of confirmation by 
uncertain evidence? In what follows, I will claim that the answer is in the 
positive. (In essence, I will be following a proposal already made in Festa, 1999, 
pp. 56-59.) 
 It is well known that various alternative measures of confirmation have 
been proposed and defended by Bayesian theorists (see Festa, 1999; Fitelson, 
1999; see also §1.1.2). For the purposes of the present study, it will be 
convenient to focus on a core set of such confirmation measures which share the 
following interesting property: they can be defined by means of a function c 
depending only on | and , c being a strictly increasing function of 
the former value and a non-increasing function of the latter. We will call such 
confirmation measures classically P-incremental. Classically P-incremental 
measures include: 
• the ‘difference’ measure, first defined by Carnap (1950/1962a, p. 
361) as: 
 H,  ! | >  
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• the ‘ratio’ measure, first defined by Keynes (1921, pp. 150-155) as: 
 
J,  ! |  
 
• the ‘odds ratio’ measure, first conceived by Alan Turing (as reported 
by Good, 1950, pp. 62-63) as5: 
 
vJ,  ! | |⁄ ⁄  
 
• and the following measure, recently discussed by Crupi et al. (2007) 
 
L,  !
&'(
')| > 1 >  if | x | >  otherwise
9 
 
Notice that, in the notation adopted here,  ! Z whereas, under 
classical Bayesian conditionalization, | ! ]. Thus, when classical 
Bayesian conditionalization applies, the above definitions can immediately be 
converted into: 
 HZ,] ! ] > Z 
 
JZ,] ! ]Z 
 
vJZ,] ! ] ]⁄Z Z⁄  
                                               
5 Advocates of measure vJ include Good himself (1950, 1983) as well as Fitelson (2001a). 
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LZ,] !
&'(
')] > Z1 > Z if ] x Z] > ZZ otherwise
9 
 
Here, the double subscript ‘[, u’ highlights the fact that confirmation is relative in 
an important sense: it is crucial for confirmation (disconfirmation) of a 
hypothesis  by a change in opinion about  to occur in the shift from one 
probability distribution, Z, to another, ] , such that Z g ]. 
 But now my claim is that these latter formulas already represent 
straightforward ways to generalize the corresponding confirmation measures as 
usually defined in the literature. This is because HZ,], JZ,], vJZ,] and LZ,] all measure (although in different ways) the departure from the initial 
probability of  – Z – of an appropriately updated probability ]. 
Under Jeffrey conditionalization, generalized confirmation will amount to the 
departure from prior probability not of the conditional Z| (which, again, 
is not attained except in the special case of  having in fact being ascertained), 
but rather of the updated probability ] to which a change in belief about 
the uncertainty of  will lead. Clearly, for any classically P-incremental Bayesian 
confirmation measure, a generalized version can be devised along these lines. 
Importantly, by such a move, any classically P-incremental measure will also 
satisfy a generalized condition of P-incrementality, i.e., it will be expressible by 
means of a function c depending only on ] and Z, c being a strictly 
increasing function of the former value and a non-increasing function of the 
latter.6 
                                               
6 Such a generalized P-incrementality condition will play an important role in what follows. For 
this reason, I am leaving aside here various confirmation measures proposed by Bayesian 
theorists which are demonstrably not P-incremental (see Carnap, 1950/1962a, p. 360; Nozick, 
1981, p. 252; Mortimer, 1988, Section 11.1; Christensen, 1999, p. 449; Joyce, 1999, Chapter 6). 
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As a final remark, notice that, even beyond Jeffrey conditionalization, 
generalized P-incremental measures are suitable to application under any kind 
of updating rule considered in probability kinematics. This is because they only 
require defined values of Z and ] themselves, however related.7  
 
2.3.3 Bayesian confirmation by uncertain evidence: test cases and 
basic principles 
 
Huber (2005) has provided a useful hypothetical test case for Bayesian 
confirmation by uncertain evidence. Suppose: 
 
  ! “All Scots wear kilts”, 
  ! “The Scottish guy Stephen wears a kilt”. 
 
Notice that    (not the converse), so that the probability of the latter given 
the former must equal 1.8 Also, a Bayesian account would provide an agent  
with initial probabilities Z and Z such that Z 0 Z, again 
because of the logical relationship between the two statements. It is then 
assumed that  is initially uncertain about both  and , so that both Z and Z are not extreme. It follows that coming to believe with certainty that “the 
Scottish guy Stephen wears a kilt” would confirm “all Scots wear kilts”, i.e., Z| 0 Z. 
                                               
7 Over the years, Bayesian theorists dealing with probability kinematics have considered various 
forms of updating, as prompted by different kinds of information (see, for instance, van Fraassen, 
1980; Jeffrey, 1992, Chapters 6–7). 
8 Strictly speaking, in order to have   , “Stephen is Scottish” should be included as a separate 
background knowledge statement within Γ, and the notation should be modified accordingly. I 
embedded the statement “Stephen is Scottish” in  simply for ease of exposition. This, however, 
has no effect on the issue discussed in the present study. 
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 Suppose that , who is not wearing her glasses, looks at Stephen and 
comes to subjectively believe that “the Scottish guy Stephen wears a kilt” with a 
moderate level of confidence, assumed to be represented by:  
 ] ! 0.6. 
 
Importantly, Huber’s (2005) discussion of the example clearly suggests that ] 0 Z, i.e., that ’s observation has increased her confidence in .  
 Now consider  looking at Stephen with her glasses on and coming to 
subjectively believe that “the Scottish guy Stephen wears a kilt” with a high level 
of confidence, e.g., such that: 
 `  ! 0.9. 
 
Commenting on his example, Huber remarks that “if some E speaks in favor of 
some H – say, because it is a logical consequence of the latter – then [...] getting to 
know that E is probably true should provide confirmation for H – and the more 
probable it is that E is true, the more it should do so” (p. 105). Here I will focus on 
the last part of this statement, conveying the following comparative principle of 
confirmation by uncertain evidence: 
 
If coming to believe with certainty that  would confirm , then,  
the more probable it becomes that  is true, the more this should  
confirm .            (H) 
 
Huber considers various Bayesian confirmation measures, provides his own 
formal analysis of Bayesian confirmation in the ‘kilt’ case and argues that the 
difference measure H, the ratio measure J and the odds ratio measure vJ all 
violate the allegedly compelling principle (H). He concludes that serious doubts 
arise on the adequacy of the Bayesian approach and elaborates the point in 
various ways. 
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 As Huber himself points out, however, his own example can be read in 
two ways: (i) on one hand, ] and `  could be seen as referring to two 
alternative possible worlds, both branching from the state represented by Z; 
(ii) on the other hand, Z, ] and `  could be seen as following each other in a 
single time sequence. Importantly, Jeffrey conditionalization can be indifferently 
applied if either (i) or (ii) is adopted and, in both cases, it provides one unique 
value for ] as well as one unique value for ` .9 Yet the distinction 
between the possible worlds and the time sequence interpretation emphasizes 
that principle (H) is equivocal, as it can be taken as reflecting each one of two 
very different adequacy requirements imposed on a candidate measure of 
confirmation by uncertain evidence . 
 If the kilt example is read in terms of possible worlds, then the most 
natural rendition of (H) is: 
 
 Provided that Z| 0 Z, if Z 5 ] 5 ` , 
then Z,] 5 Z,`.                   (H.1) 
 
In words, this means that the higher the increase from the initial probability of 
an  confirming  the higher the confirmatory impact on  will be.  
 If, however, the kilt example is read in terms of a single time sequence 
(which is Huber’s main line in his paper), then principle (H) can also be seen as 
stating: 
 
                                               
9 One may doubt that `  will remain equal when arrived at from Z  vs. from ] , i.e., that 
Z| = `  M Z| = `  ! ]| = `  M ]| = ` . 
This will be so, however, by virtue of a condition known as rigidity (Jeffrey, 1965, Chapter 11) or 
invariance (Jeffrey, 2004, p. 52), according to which Z| ! ]| and Z| !]|. It can be proven that rigidity is implied by Jeffrey conditionalization (indeed, it is 
logically equivalent to it). 
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Provided that Z| 0 Z, if Z 5 ] 5 ` , 
then Z,] 5 ],`.                  (H.2) 
 
As compared to (H.1), this is a completely different claim: it means that any 
subsequent increase (no matter how small) in the probability of an  confirming  will have a greater confirmatory impact on  than any previous increase (no 
matter how large) in the probability of .  
 My claim here is that, while (H.1) is a perfectly safe and sound intuitive 
constraint on an adequate theory of confirmation by uncertain evidence, (H.2) is 
utterly implausible (as it will be argued shortly).  
 As for (H.1), it can be shown that (see the Appendix ~ for a proof): 
 
Theorem 2.1: Any Bayesian confirmation measure Z,] enjoying generalized 
P-incrementality satisfies (H.1). 
 
By contrast, in appropriate cases all alternative confirmation measures 
considered here will agree in violating (H.2) – as they should. In fact, it is easy to 
conceive examples where the increase from ] to `  is so much smaller 
(on any plausible standard of comparison) than the increase from Z to ] that (H.2) is a highly unappealing principle. 
 To illustrate, suppose that: 
 Z| ! 1, Z ! 0.05, Z ! 0.10, ] ! 0.80, `  ! 0.81. 
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By Jeffrey conditionalization, it can be computed that: 
 ] ! 0.40, `  ! 0.405. 
 
Then: 
 HZ,] ! ] > Z ! 0.35 0 0.005 ! `  > ] ! H],`. 
 
Similarly, it can be computed that: 
 JZ,] ! 8 0 1.0125 ! J],`, 
 vJZ,] r 12.667 0 1.021 r vJ],`, 
 LZ,] r 0.368 0 0.008 r L],`. 
 
Thus, all four confirmation measures considered here appropriately violate (H.2) 
in simple clear-cut cases, i.e., when a subsequent increase in the probability of an  confirming  is unequivocally very small (e.g., 0.80 to 0.81) as compared to a 
previous increase in the probability of the same  (e.g., 0.10 to 0.80).10 
                                               
10 It is fair to say that this line of argument is partly anticipated, and criticized, by Huber (2005) 
towards the end of his paper (pp. 111ff.). Huber’s critical point essentially amounts to the 
remark that, when uncertain evidence is at issue, Z,] crucially depends on Z  even in 
qualitative terms (confirmation vs. disconfirmation). This seems, however, an appropriate 
feature of Bayesian confirmation by uncertain evidence. Indeed, should it be the case that – for 
any reason – looking at Stephen actually decreased ’s confidence in  down to 0.6 from an 
initially higher value, we would like to say that this has disconfirmed  to some extent. In fact, in 
such a situation, Z,] would assume a negative value, since by Jeffrey conditionalization ] would itself be lower than Z. (Also see footnote 11.) 
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 In conclusion, contrary to Huber’s claim, Bayesian confirmation theory, 
when properly generalized, actually gets things right when it comes to 
confirmation by uncertain evidence – i.e., satisfies principle (H.1) and violates 
(H.2).11 
 
                                               
11 The lack of an explicit unpacking of statement (H) may not be the only reason why Huber 
(2005) thinks otherwise. From his analysis, it seems that a further reason boils down to his own 
way of applying Bayesian confirmation under Jeffrey conditionalization. To illustrate, consider 
the ‘difference’ measure of confirmation. In line with the notation utilized so far, Huber (2005, p. 
104) seems to have primarily employed the following way of computing degrees of confirmation:  
HZ,]  ! ]| > ]. 
This is unfortunate, however, for this quantity does not measure the departure of the 
appropriately updated probability of  from the initial one. In fact, under Jeffrey 
conditionalization, it seems obvious that ], and not ]|, represents the degree of 
belief in  at time u – when the probability of  has shifted to non-extreme values – whereas Z, and not ], represents the initial degree of belief in . Indeed, if HZ,]  is adopted, 
not only the implausible principle (H.2), but even the compelling requirement (H.1) itself will be 
systematically violated. This is bad enough, but it gets worse. For HZ,]  implies that even a 
decrease in the probability of a confirming  will confirm . In fact, it can be proven that, for 
whatever (non-extreme) value of Z and ], provided that Z| 0 Z, HZ,]  
will be higher than the neutrality value 0. In the presence of what I see as a highly plausible 
alternative way to apply Bayesian confirmation to uncertain evidence, which does not exhibit 
such undesirable properties, the latter remarks seem to show the inadequacy of HZ,]  – not of 
Bayesian confirmation theory itself. 
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Chapter 3  
An experimental study on inductive 
reasoning with uncertain evidence 
 
3.1 Aim of the study 
 
Judgments concerning the support that a piece of information brings to a 
hypothesis are commonly required in scientific research as well as in other 
domains (medicine, law). A major aim of a theory of inductive reasoning is to 
provide a proper foundation for such confirmation judgments. 
 Previous research has shown that, after acquiring some pieces of certain 
evidence, intuitive assessments of inductive confirmation can be elicited directly, 
as people prove able to appropriately distinguish between posteriors and 
degrees of confirmation (see Tentori, Crupi, Bonini, & Osherson, 2007). It has 
also been observed that intuitive confirmation judgments based on ascertained 
evidence tend to conform to normatively appealing models such as K and L (see 
Crupi, Tentori, & Gonzalez, 2007). 
 However, in a large number of real situations, the evidence available is 
not certain, and the psychology of confirmation by uncertain evidence appears to 
have remained unexplored so far. The present experimental study aims at 
answering the following basic questions: 
• Do judgments of inductive strength depend on the degree of 
evidential uncertainty? 
• To what extent of accuracy can people judge the impact of an 
uncertain piece of evidence on a given hypothesis? 
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Two experiments have been carried out in an attempt to investigate whether the 
noteworthy results of previous studies on confirmation can be extended to 
scenarios involving uncertain evidence12. 
 
 
3.2 Experiment I 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
Uncertainty is recognized as a ubiquitous challenge for human cognition and 
theories thereof (see, e.g., Hastie & Dawes, 2001; Jeffrey, 1992; Oaksford & 
Chater, 2007). Nonetheless, major theoretical accounts of reasoning typically 
assume some evidence to be known with certainty and to play a crucial role. 
Bayesianism is no exception, at least in its ‘textbook’ versions (Hartmann, 2008): 
a Bayesian agent is supposed to evaluate hypotheses by probabilistically 
conditionalizing on data that are acquired as certain. As useful as it may be for 
epistemological analysis, the latter assumption amounts to a rather crude 
simplification in psychological terms, as it is rarely met in real settings. In a 
murder trial, for instance, the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime may 
be highly relevant for the hypothesis of guilt, yet it can hardly be completely 
ascertained in a court of law. At best, a DNA test or a reliable testimony can make 
it very probable. Indeed, in a variety of situations, people may need to assess the 
impact of a piece of evidence with probabilities that significantly change without 
attaining extreme values. 
Psychological research on inductive reasoning has largely shared the 
focus on ascertained evidence. For instance, from seminal inquiries up to more 
recent developments, the categorical induction paradigm presents participants 
with the consideration of a hypothesis/conclusion (e.g., “Birds have an ulnar 
                                               
12 Much of the material in §3.2, §3.3, and §3.4 appears in Mastropasqua, Crupi, & Tentori 
(submitted). 
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artery”) as possibly supported by an allegedly known fact given as a premise 
(e.g., “Robins have an ulnar artery”) (see, e.g., Osherson et al., 1990; Heit, 1998; 
Medin et al., 2003; Blok, Medin, & Osherson, 2007; Blok, Osherson, & Medin, 
2007; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009). Now that a considerable amount of data and 
theorizing has been accumulated, it seems of interest to extend the empirical 
study of inductive reasoning beyond the limits of this framework, addressing 
how uncertain evidence is employed in hypothesis evaluation. 
In what follows, two experiments concerning assessments of the 
inductive impact of uncertain evidence will be presented. Before that, however, I 
will need to briefly illustrate the relevant theoretical framework which extends 
the basic Bayesian account to the uncertain evidence case. The two experiments 
will then provide an empirical test of the descriptive adequacy of this normative 
benchmark. 
 
JEFFREY’S RULE OF CONDITIONALIZATION 
Consider a pair of complementary hypotheses of interest  and  (extending 
the following treatment to any richer partition is straightforward). In the 
Bayesian framework, it is assumed that, at a given time N, the belief state of an 
agent is represented by a probability function  defined over  and . It may 
occur that, from time N to N M 1, the agent experiences a change in opinion 
concerning a further statement  – provided that  is not extreme to begin 
with, i.e., 0 5  5 1. Jeffrey conditionalization provides a natural way to 
update the probability values of  and , in case the agent’s degree of belief in  changes from time N to N M 1 without reaching certainty. According to Jeffrey’s 
rule, it is assumed that (see §2.2 and §2.3.2):  
 
  ! | =  M | =                      (3.1) 
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Thus,  is computed as an average of the ‘old’ conditional probabilities of  on  vs. , weighted by the current probabilities of  and , respectively.  
Jeffrey’s generalized rule of conditionalization is both elegant and 
plausible. Indeed, by virtue of the theorem of total probabilities, this updating 
rule turns out to be mandatory through mere probabilistic coherence once it is 
assumed that | ! | and | ! | – a 
condition named rigidity (Jeffrey, 1965, Ch. 11) or invariance (Jeffrey, 2004, p. 
52). (See Oaksford & Chater, 2007, pp. 113ff. for a discussion of the rigidity 
condition in psychology.)  
Along with Jeffrey’s, another influential treatment of probability updating 
upon uncertain evidence has been devised by Pearl (1988). Labeled the method 
of virtual evidence, the latter account exploits the powerful formalism of 
Bayesian networks. It is worth noting, thus, that Chan and Darwiche (2005) 
provided mathematical results to the effect that one can neatly translate any of 
Jeffrey’s and Pearl’s machinery into the other. 
 
FROM CONDITIONALIZATION TO CONFIRMATION BY UNCERTAIN EVIDENCE 
For most contemporary Bayesian theorists, there is a major conceptual 
difference between posterior probability (whatever the kind of 
conditionalization being involved) and inductive confirmation (see, e.g., Carnap, 
1950/1962a; Fitelson, 1999; see also §1.1.1 and §1.1.2). Inductive confirmation 
is a relative notion in a very crucial sense: the credibility of a hypothesis can be 
changed in either a positive (confirmation in a narrow sense) or negative way 
(disconfirmation) by a given piece of evidence. Confirmation (in the narrow 
sense) thus reflects an increase from prior to posterior probability, whereas 
disconfirmation reflects a decrease. As a consequence, the degree of 
confirmation is not the same as the posterior probability. To illustrate, the 
probability of an otherwise very rare disease () can be quite low even after a 
relevant positive test result (); yet  is inductively confirmed by  to the extent 
that its probability has risen thereby. By the same token, the probability of the 
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absence of the disease () can be quite high despite the positive test result (), 
yet  is disconfirmed by  to the extent that its probability has decreased 
thereby. As confirmation concerns the relationship between prior and posterior, 
there is simply no single probability value that can capture the notion.  
A natural way to measure degrees of inductive confirmation amounts to 
positing a function , mapping a relevant set of probability values from  and  onto a number which is positive, null or negative depending on the 
posterior of  being higher, equal or lower as compared to its prior, i.e.: 
  
, :0 0 if   0 ! 0 if   ! 5 0 if   5 9                                                                   (3.2) 
 
Various alternative measures of confirmation have been proposed and defended 
which satisfy this basic constraint (see Festa, 1999; Fitelson, 1999; Crupi et al., 
2007; Crupi, Festa, & Buttasi, in press; see also §1.1.2 and §2.3.2). As shown by 
Crupi, Festa and Mastropasqua (2008), moreover, major confirmation measures 
can be defined in a completely general fashion, i.e., not depending on the 
particular rule of conditionalization leading from  to if  . In this 
way, they can be readily applied when the credibility of hypothesis  is affected 
by a change in the probability of some relevant piece of evidence  which does 
not attain certainty. In what follows, I will focus on the following measures of 
inductive confirmation (for brevity of notation, ‘v’ denotes odds, so that v !  ⁄  and v !  ⁄ ):  
 
 K, ! DDDD                 (3.3a) 
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L, ! :AB
DABDABD if  x ABDABDABD otherwise 9              (3.3b) 
 
Measure K, is strictly connected with the log likelihood ratio measure 
first conceived by Alan Turing (as reported by Good, 1950, pp. 62-63; also see 
Kemeny & Oppenheim, 1952; Fitelson, 2001)13.  
While non-equivalent in general terms, measures K, and L, 
share a number of properties which single them out as particularly appealing as 
normative models (see Eells & Fitelson, 2002; Crupi et al., 2007; see also §1.1.2). 
Among other things, each of K, and L, achieves a fixed finite 
maximum [minimum] value +1 [–1] in the limiting case of an ascertained piece 
of evidence  implying [contradicting] , thus naturally matching the bounded, 
bidirectional and symmetric rating scale employed in the experiments I am 
presenting.  
Experiment I was conceived as a first test of the descriptive adequacy of 
measures K, and L, relative to judgments of confirmation by 
uncertain evidence. The degree of uncertainty of evidence was manipulated by a 
purposely devised sampling procedure, as explained below. 
 
3.2.2 Method 
 
Thirty-three students (17 females, mean age 25 years) from the University of 
Trento participated in Experiment I in exchange for course credit.  
Participants performed two tasks: a confirmation task first, then a 
probability task.14 A custom Java application was used for stimuli presentation 
and to collect participants’ responses.  
                                               
13 Indeed, under strict Bayesian conditionalization, K, ! tanh  ln| |⁄ . 
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CONFIRMATION TASK 
Participants were presented with seven sets of four inductive arguments each. 
The four arguments in a set each involved an identical piece of evidence and a 
different hypothesis. The probability of evidence varied across the seven sets 
(seven levels, one for each set, ranging between 100% and 0%, see Table 3.1) 
and was manipulated by means of the following scenario:15 
 
Consider a group of 1,000 students, 500 males and 500 
females, randomly selected at the University of Trento. For the 
sake of convenience, these 1,000 students have been ordered 
alphabetically by their surname, from A to Z. Starting from the 
beginning of the alphabetical list, separation lines have been 
entered after each set of ten students, as shown below. [The 
relevant graphical display was provided.] In this way, the 
1,000 students have been divided into 100 groups, each 
formed by 10 students. In what follows we will repeatedly 
draw at random one among the 100 groups of students, then 
again one at random among the 10 students in that group. 
Draws will be independent at each trial (so, in principle, the 
same student might be selected more than once). 
 
The gender of the drawn student represented the relevant evidence and the 
double sampling procedure (i.e., first drawing a group, then a student from that 
                                                                                                                                      
14 Confirmation judgments represented the ultimate variable of interest of this study, with 
probability estimates providing relevant data for the empirical test of Bayesian confirmation 
measures. By consequence, task order was kept fixed for all participants in an effort to preserve 
the intuitive and naïve character of confirmation assessments from any risk of carry over effects. 
15 All materials are translated from Italian. 
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group) provided a plausible way to manipulate its probability. For example, 
participants concurred that a student drawn from a group of 8 males and 2 
females had a 0.8 probability of being male vs. a 0.2 probability of being female.  
After the student was said to have been drawn, participants were 
presented with a set of four inductive arguments each involving the same 
information about the probability of the student being a male vs. female coupled 
with one among four different hypotheses (see Table 3.1 for a full description of 
the hypotheses employed). An example of argument as displayed in the 
experiment is provided by the Figure 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: The seven levels of uncertain evidence and four 
hypotheses appearing in the inductive arguments employed in 
Experiment I 
 
Information about uncertain evidence 
 
the drawn student is 
male with probability [100%; 80%; 70%; 50%; 30%; 20%; 0%]  
female with probability [0%; 20%; 30%; 50%; 70%; 80%; 100%]  
 
Hypotheses 
 
the drawn student 
[owns a 10,000 euro motorbike; owns a 10,000 euro necklace;  
usually has a beard shave; usually applies eye make-up] 
 
Participants were asked to estimate inductive confirmation concerning the four 
arguments presented. In order to do so, they were asked to drag each argument 
icon on an ‘impact scale’, thus assigning it a value. The scale (see Figure 3.2) had 
two opposite directions, corresponding to positive and negative impact, 
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respectively, as well as a neutral point in the middle, corresponding to no 
impact. 
 
Figure 3.1: Example of argument employed in Experiment I 
 
INFORMATION (surely true): 
the drawn student is 
male with 80% probability  
female with 20% probability  
 
HYPOTHESIS (can be true or false): 
the drawn student  
owns a 10,000 euro motorbike 
 
Figure 3.2: The impact scale used for confirmation judgments in Experiment I 
 
  
Participants were instructed to place the argument icon as much to the right 
[left] as they judged the information given about the uncertainty of evidence to 
increase [decrease] the plausibility of the hypothesis. Once they expressed their 
judgments, a novel double sampling was said to have been performed, and 
participants were requested to evaluate another set of inductive arguments; and 
so on for all seven sets. 
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On the whole, 28 confirmation judgments were collected for each 
participant (7 sets times 4 hypotheses). The concurrent evaluation of four 
arguments fostered relevant comparisons and appropriate use of the 
quantitative scale. (Based on pilot studies, the four hypotheses chosen were 
expected to elicit quantitatively different judgments on both the positive and 
negative side of the impact scale.) 
 
PROBABILITY TASK 
After the confirmation task, participants were asked to consider again a group of 
1,000 students, 500 males and 500 females, and to answer questions like the 
following, for each hypothesis:  
 
How many male students out of 500 own a 10,000 euro motorbike? 
How many male students out of 500 do not own a 10,000 euro motorbike? 
How many female students out of 500 own a 10,000 euro motorbike? 
How many female students out of 500 do not own a 10,000 euro motorbike? 
 
Complementary estimates were asked in order to increase accuracy. Participants 
could begin from the estimate they preferred; the software required each pair of 
complementary estimates to sum up to 500 (in Appendix , a sequence of screen 
displays produced by Java application is provided to better illustrate the 
experimental procedure of Experiment I).  
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3.2.3 Results and Discussion 
 
In what follows, I denote by ^, any of the twenty-eight confirmation 
judgments expressed by participants during the confirmation task. Following the 
notation used in §3.2.1,  stands for a hypothesis, corresponding to one of those 
shown in Table 3.1; subscripts N and N M 1 indicate, respectively, the initial and 
subsequent degrees of belief concerning statement , which in turn can be 
regarded as “the drawn student is male”. 
In order to test relevant theoretical predictions against collected 
judgments, quantities  and  were calculated for each of the 
twenty-eight arguments presented and for each participant by means of the 
theorem of total probability and Jeffrey’s conditionalization rule, respectively, 
i.e.: 
 
[theorem of total probabilities]  ! | =  M | =                                (3.4a) 
 
[Jeffrey conditionalization]   ! | =  M | =                    (3.4b) 
 
Notice that all values in Eqs. (3.4) were available. The experimental procedure 
fixed  and . In particular, the initial probability that the drawn 
student was male, , was set at 0.5, as participants were informed from the 
beginning that the overall group of 1,000 students was formed by an equal 
number of males and females;  was then provided by the additional 
information contained in each argument as amounting to one of the seven levels 
of evidence uncertainty reported in Table 3.1. Values | and |, 
on the other hand, emerged from the estimates that each participant expressed 
while performing the probability task and were simply obtained through 
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division by 500 of the estimate given in response to the question about the 
number of male and female students (out of 500) satisfying hypothesis  (e.g., 
owning a 10,000 euro motorbike; see Table 3.1). 
If confirmation by uncertain evidence is appropriately assessed, then ^, should match the basic condition displayed for , in 
§3.2.1 (see Eq. 3.2), i.e., it should be the case that: 
 
^, :0 0 if   0 ! 0 if   ! 5 0 if   5 9                                               (3.5) 
 
The first analysis aimed at checking whether the basic normative constraint in 
Eq. (3.5) was indeed satisfied. Overall, only 17 among 28 × 33 = 924 (1.8%) ^, violated Eq. (3.5). The same analysis was also carried out after 
splitting the confirmation judgments into two subsets consisting of limiting 
cases of evidence uncertainty vs. cases of strict evidence uncertainty, 
respectively. The former subset includes 8 × 33 = 264 judgments with  
amounting to either 100% or 0% (indicating that either  or  was in fact 
certain evidence at N M 1); the latter subset includes all other 20 × 33 = 660 
judgments, with  amounting to intermediate values between 80% and 
20% (see Table 3.1). In both subsets the proportion of violations of Eq. (3.5) was 
negligible (0.4% in limiting cases and 2.4% under strict uncertainty). Thus, 
intuitive confirmation judgments elicited in Experiment I largely reflect the 
theoretical distinction of positive, null and negative impact even when evidence 
is strictly uncertain. 
A second kind of analysis was aimed at measuring the degree of association 
between participants’ confirmation judgments and the corresponding 
quantitative degrees of confirmation as predicted by measures K and L. In line 
with the notation introduced earlier, I denote by K, and L, any 
confirmation judgment as predicted by K and L, respectively. For each 
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participant, the 28 K, and L, values were first computed, by 
directly substituting  and  into the relevant expressions (see Eqs. 
(3.3) in §3.2.1). For two participants, some K, turned out to be undefined 
because  and  were zero for some hypotheses  (division by 
zero) and were thus excluded from the present analysis. For each of the 
remaining 31 participants, Pearson16 correlations were computed between the 
28 ^, and the corresponding 28 K,, Z,H, and posterior 
probabilities as arising from Jeffrey conditionalization. Average correlations 
across participants are shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Results from experiment I 
 
  Predicted 
confirmation (K) Predicted confirmation (L)  Posterior probability (Jeffrey conditionalization) 
Judged 
confirmation 
 
0.913* 0.903*  0.662 
 
Note. The table contains average Pearson correlations between judged confirmation and 
confirmation predicted by K and L, and between judged confirmation and posterior 
probability computed by Jeffrey conditionalization. Each value is the average of 31 
Pearson correlations (one per participant) involving 28 observations. (Starred averages 
are reliably greater than the average for posterior probability by paired t-test,  5 0.01.) 
 
If participants’ judgments did not appropriately reflect the distinction between 
confirmation and posteriors, then the average correlation from posterior 
probability would have been close to 1. It can be seen that, on the contrary, 
posterior probability produced the lowest average correlation. Indeed, paired t-
tests revealed that average correlations yielded by K and L were both reliably 
greater than that computed by posterior probability ( 5 0.01). Thus, 
                                               
16 I assume ^, to lie on interval scale, as participants expressed their confirmation 
judgments through a continuous scale.  
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participants were apparently able to assess confirmation as distinct from 
posterior probability. Furthermore, the high average correlations with both K 
and L indicate that participants’ confirmation judgments were normatively 
sound, viz. close to those implied by credible theoretical models, with a small but 
significant ( 5 0.01, by paired t-test) higher predictive accuracy of K as 
compared to L. 
The same quantitative analyses were also carried out on a more detailed 
level by identifying three subsets of judgments. The first subset amounts to the 
limiting cases of evidence uncertainty as defined above, i.e., with  equal 
to either 100% or 0%. The second and third subsets consist in two classes of 
cases of strict evidence uncertainty:  equal to either 80% or 20% and  equal to either 70% or 30%, respectively. Results closely matched 
those from the general analysis reported above. Average correlations with each 
of the measures K and L were statistically indistinguishable across all three 
subsets. Within each subset, both K and L were consistently superior predictors 
as compared to posterior probability ( 5 0.01 by paired t-tests), with K 
consistently more accurate than L ( 5 0.05 by paired t-tests).  
 
 
3.3 Experiment II 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
Experiment I employed inductive arguments in which the probability of 
evidence was explicitly provided (e.g., “the drawn student is male with 
probability 80%, female with probability 20%”). Results show that participants’ 
judgments largely conform to plausible normative models. However, in most 
inductive arguments from real life people have to deal with uncertain evidence 
while not being given any numerical measure of belief by some external source. 
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As a test of generality, in Experiment II the uncertainty of evidence has been 
manipulated indirectly, by means of ambiguous pictures.  
 
3.3.2 Method 
 
Thirty-four students (15 females, mean age 26 years) from the University of 
Trento participated in Experiment II in exchange for course credit. None had 
participated in Experiment I. As in Experiment I, participants performed a 
confirmation task followed by a probability task presented through a custom 
Java application. 
 
CONFIRMATION TASK 
The confirmation task was basically the same as in Experiment I, the only 
difference being the way in which evidential uncertainty had been manipulated. 
In Experiment II, participants were presented with the following scenario: 
 
Consider a group of 1,000 students, 500 males and 500 
females, randomly selected at the University of Trento. In 
what follows we will repeatedly draw at random one among 
the 1,000 students, and we will show you a picture of her/his 
hand. Draws will be independent at each trial (so, in principle, 
the same student might be selected more than once). 
 
As it can be seen, no double sampling procedure was involved in this scenario; 
the student was said to have been directly drawn from the larger sample of 
1,000. The uncertainty of evidence concerning student’s gender was implicitly 
manipulated through the picture of her/his hand. Based on a pilot study, 
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pictures were selected as displaying more or less relevant cues to gender, thus 
determining more or less extreme departures of the probability of being 
male/female from the initial base-rate level of 0.5. At each trial, an enlarged 
picture of the hand appeared on the screen for 10 seconds and participants were 
prompted to look at it very carefully and in detail. The picture then automatically 
reduced in size (but could still be widened simply by clicking on it) and 
participants were asked to answer the following questions: 
 
In light of the picture, do you think the drawn student is male or female? 
(Participants had to choose one option: male vs. female) 
What is the probability that your previous answer is correct? 
(Participants had to place the cursor on a sliding bar ranging from 50% to 
100%) 
 
Responses to the questions above provide an estimate of participants’ perceived 
degree of uncertainty about the evidence concerning gender. Afterwards, a set of 
four inductive arguments was presented, while a reminder on the top-right of 
the screen reported the degree of uncertainty previously assigned to the 
evidence. As in Experiment I, participants had to estimate inductive 
confirmation. The hypotheses as well as the scale employed and the rest of the 
procedure were the same as in Experiment I (in Appendix H, a sequence of 
screen displays produced by Java application is provided to better illustrate the 
experimental procedure of Experiment II). An example of inductive argument as 
displayed in Experiment II is provided by the Figure 3.3. 
 
 PROBABILITY TASK 
The probability task was exactly the same as in Experiment I. 
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Figure 3.3: Example of argument employed in Experiment II 
 
INFORMATION (surely true): 
this is the drawn student’s hand  
 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS (can be true or false): 
the drawn student  
owns a 10,000 euro motorbike 
 
 
3.3.3 Results and Discussion 
 
In Experiment II, 28 × 34 = 952 ^, were collected. On the whole, 63 
(6.6%) of them violated Eq. (3.5) above, i.e., the basic normative distinction of 
positive, null and negative impact. Based on the participants’ own interpretation 
of the pictures displayed, limiting cases of evidence uncertainty (i.e., with judged  amounting to either 100% or 0%) were a small minority, namely 56 
(5.9%) judgments out of 953. The proportions of violations of Eq. (3.5) in the 
latter set and among all remaining judgments involving strict evidence 
uncertainty were 5.4% and 6.7%, respectively. Overall, while still minor, 
departures from Eq. (3.5) were somewhat more common than in Experiment I 
(z-test for proportion,  5 0.01), presumably reflecting an increased difficulty of 
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the task. The pattern arising from quantitative analyses was nevertheless very 
similar to that in Experiment I.  
Average Pearson correlations from K, L and posterior probability are shown in 
Table 3.3. Once again, both K and L yielded very high average correlations, 
significantly greater than that with posterior probability ( 5 0.01 by paired t-
test). Much as in Experiment I, moreover, the higher average correlation of 
measure K as compared to L also reaches statistical significance ( 5 0.05). 
Finally, as in Experiment I, results are not inflated by limiting cases of evidence 
uncertainty, as all significance tests remain unaffected under strict evidence 
uncertainty, i.e., by the removal of the five participants who sometimes provided 
extreme values for .  
 
Table 3.3: Results from experiment II 
 
  Predicted 
confirmation (K) Predicted confirmation (L)  Posterior probability (Jeffrey conditionalization) 
Judged 
confirmation 
 
0.902* 0.893*  0.605 
 
Note. The table contains average Pearson correlations between judged confirmation and 
confirmation predicted by K and L, and between judged confirmation and posterior 
probability computed by Jeffrey conditionalization. Each value is the average of 34 
Pearson correlations (one per participant) involving 28 observations. (Starred averages 
are reliably greater than the average for posterior probability by paired t-test,  50.01.) 
 
 
3.4 General discussion 
 
Ever since the work of chief Bayesian theorists such as Keynes (1921), Carnap 
(1950/1962a) and Good (1950), a basic component of inductive reasoning has 
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been identified in the notion of evidence prompting a change in belief – viz. 
confirmation – as distinct from final belief per se. In philosophy of science and 
epistemology, the debate on the issue has been lasting (see, e.g., Earman, 1992; 
Fitelson, 1999). In the psychological literature, on the other hand, Bayesian 
confirmation has occurred sparsely and indirectly, often by different names. It 
has been invoked, for instance, in discussions concerning the reality of the 
‘conjunction fallacy’ (see Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002; Crupi, Fitelson, 
& Tentori, 2008) and related phenomena (see Lagnado & Shanks, 2002) as well 
as in inquiries into various aspects of the perception of chance (e.g., Tenenbaum 
& Griffiths, 2001). A specific principle of confirmation theory has been 
experimentally studied by Lo, Sides, Rozelle, & Osherson (2002) and found to be 
largely adhered to in children’s reasoning. Bayesian confirmation also yields 
formal and conceptual connections with models of the value of information 
(Nelson, 2005), involved in a number of established research areas in 
psychology such as Wason’s selection task (see Klayman & Ha, 1987; Oaksford & 
Chater, 1994, 2003; Nickerson, 1996; McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2000; Fitelson, in 
press).  
The experiments reported above extend recent studies explicitly devoted 
to the psychology of confirmation (Tentori et al., 2007; Crupi et al., 2007; 
Tentori, Crupi, & Osherson, in press). Tentori et al. (2007), in particular, 
employed an urn setting with sequential draws where relevant evidence (the 
color of drawn balls) was certain (indeed, established by participants 
themselves by direct observation). In this study, intuitive judgments of 
confirmation reflected to a remarkable extent the formal notion as represented 
by normatively appealing accounts such as measures K and L (see also Crupi et 
al., 2007). The present experiments replicate this basic finding in a different 
setting and generalize it to the assessment of confirmation by uncertain 
evidence.  
In order to appreciate the results reported here, it is useful to consider 
the following points about the procedures adopted. First, participants were not 
faced with problems involving artificially devised predicates (such as the color of 
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balls or the composition of urn, as in Tentori et al., 2007) or blank (i.e., 
semantically opaque) properties, as is common in other experimental paradigms 
for the study of inductive reasoning (e.g., Osherson et al., 1990); rather, real-
world and transparent hypotheses were employed. Second, convergent results 
were obtained with two different ways of manipulating evidence uncertainty, 
i.e., directly providing probabilistic information (Experiment I) vs. relying on the 
interpretation of ambiguous pictures conveying uncertainty (Experiment II). 
Finally, and more generally, the relative difficulty of the task should be 
mentioned, which makes participants’ performance remarkable. A confirmation 
judgment always reflects the consideration of two distinct variables (viz. prior 
and posterior probability) as well as the quantitative relationship between them. 
By their normatively sound responses, participants proved to be able to 
integrate the degree of evidence uncertainty into this sophisticated assessment. 
Such a result is in line with Tentori et al.’s (2007) findings under conditions of 
strictly certain evidence, and supports the centrality of confirmation judgments 
in human cognition. 
Beyond a generally high correlation with observed judgments, 
Experiment I and II also documented a slight but significant advantage of 
measure K over L in terms of descriptive accuracy. Interestingly, Crupi et al. 
(2007) had reported a similar but reversed pattern: K and L turned out to be 
very good predictors with a slight but significant advantage for the latter. 
Measures K and L thus appear to be close competitors in capturing confirmation 
assessment in human reasoning. More definite conclusions about their 
respective merits remain an issue for further research.   
To conclude, I shall notice that a growing trend of claims depicts various 
aspects of human inductive reasoning involving certain evidence as 
appropriately captured by sophisticated models arising from the Bayesian 
approach and involving normatively sound principles (see, e.g., Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2006; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Crupi, 
Tentori, & Lombardi, in press; but also Sloman & Fernbach, 2008, for a critical 
view). However, as far as inductive confirmation by uncertain evidence is 
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concerned, available normative models had not been put to empirical test so far. 
The experiments reported here open up this line of investigation, providing 
evidence that those models prove psychologically tenable. 
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Chapter 4  
Conclusion 
4.1 The study of inductive reasoning: a critical summary 
 
Inductive reasoning merits investigation for many reasons. It represents 
everyday reasoning and is fundamental for numerous cognitive activities, such 
as learning, prediction, and discovery (Baron, 2008). In general, we make 
inductive inferences every time we use our knowledge to deal with novel 
situations. Without induction, for example, we could not generalize from one 
instance to another, or draw scientific hypotheses from the experimental 
evidence at our disposal. According to Polya (1954), inductive reasoning is 
central even to non-empirical research, such as mathematical inquiry. Before 
achieving a rigorous proof of a theorem, a critical step in mathematical 
investigation is the formulation of a conjecture. Conjectures are suggested by 
observation and indicated by particular instances. In short, they are developed 
through induction.  
It has been noted that the study of induction has a long history in the field 
of philosophy and epistemology. Among the most well-known analyses in 
philosophy is Hume’s (1748/2004) argument against the logical justification of 
induction. Hume argues that, unlike deductive inference, there are no rational 
reasons for induction. In other words, Hume rejects the idea that there could be 
any logical justification for the validity of a method that generates inductive 
inferences.  
The so-called philosophical problem of induction, raised by Hume, consists 
in the following quandary: paraphrasing Carnap (1962b), on one hand inductive 
reasoning is used by people without apparent scruples, and the feeling is that it 
is valid and indispensable. On the other hand, once Hume rouses our intellectual 
conscience, no answer is found to his objection. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that 
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the epistemological understanding of the scope and forms of inductive reasoning 
has achieved important results up to very recent times. 
Although psychological research on inductive reasoning has not directly 
addressed this old problem of induction, it has uncovered a rich and interesting 
collection of phenomena, highlighting how inductive reasoning is rife in human 
thought (see Heit, 2000, for a review of psychological work on inductive 
reasoning). 
In the psychological literature, the study of induction appears in several 
forms. However, it is worth noting that most psychological studies have focused 
on a particular kind of induction, i.e., category-based induction. The work by 
Osherson et al. (1990) represents a milestone in the study of category-based 
induction. Yet, the similarity-coverage model they proposed shows some 
weaknesses. By assuming that a category has a certain property, it seems 
plausible that a similar category has that property too. But, for some properties 
and some categories, similarity does not seem to be central to inductive 
inferences (Heit & Rubinstein, 1994; Smith et al., 1993). Furthermore, the 
similarity notion is not defined in a rigorous way; it is quite elusive and vague.  
As an alternative to the similarity-coverage model, Sloman (1993) has 
conceived and advocated a model – the feature-based model – in which argument 
strength is roughly measured in terms of feature overlap between premise and 
conclusion categories. Both the similarity-coverage model and the feature-based 
model are able to make accurate predictions when predicates appearing in 
inductive arguments are ‘blank’. But the study of inductive reasoning cannot be 
confined to arguments with blank predicates. This is because not only the 
categories, but also the properties involved in inductive arguments are crucial 
when making inductive inferences. Indeed, it has been emphasized that different 
properties (e.g., behavioral properties or properties concerning anatomical 
features) may foster diverse patterns of inductive behavior (Heit, 1998; Medin et 
al., 2003).  
It has also been highlighted that inductive processes may be guided by 
different kinds of knowledge (Lopez et al., 1997; Proffitt et al., 2000). According 
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to Tenenbaum et al. (2006, 2007) and Shafto et al. (2007), a specific knowledge 
would be employed in a given context. For example, taxonomic knowledge would 
be preferred when reasoning about properties concerning anatomical features, 
whereas ecological knowledge would be preferred when reasoning about 
diseases that may spread through an ecosystem.  
On Shafto et al.’s (2007) account, the selection of a particular knowledge 
depends on the ease with which that knowledge comes to mind. The approach 
followed by Shafto et al. (2007) is based on the idea of availability. Availability is 
seen as a relevant factor in the recruitment of the knowledge that drives a 
specific inductive inference. This idea traces back to a classical work by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1973), who discuss availability as a heuristic “by which people 
evaluate the frequency of classes or the likelihood of events” (p. 207). Even though 
this heuristic serves as an effective strategy to account for a large number of 
phenomena related to category-based induction, the concept of availability is 
rather vague. Like the concept of similarity, it is not rigorously defined.  
Also Rehder’s (2006, 2007) approach to the study of inductive reasoning 
can explain numerous phenomena concerning category-based induction. Rehder 
has developed a theory that underlines the importance of causal reasoning in 
induction. Yet, his view seems too restricted, as causal reasoning is cited as the 
only factor that influences inductive inferences. 
A more precise account of induction is provided by Heit (1998) and 
Tenenbaum et al. (2006). In their theories, induction is modeled as Bayesian 
inference. Their general framework is defined in a very precise way, on the basis 
of the probability notion. Both the Bayesian model of Heit (1998) and the 
theory-based Bayesian models of Tenenbaum et al. (2006) are able to predict 
many phenomena related to induction, by positing that people can rely on 
diverse kinds of prior knowledge. However, the Bayesian models of Heit (1998) 
and Tenenbaum et al. (2006) do not take into consideration the crucial 
distinction between inductive strength and posterior probability. According to 
their models, once prior beliefs are assigned, the inductive strength of an 
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argument is given by the belief value of the conclusion, updated in light of the 
premise. 
For most contemporary Bayesian theorists, there is a conceptual 
difference between inductive strength (or confirmation) and posterior 
probability. The notion of confirmation reflects the change from the prior 
probability to the posterior probability of argument’s conclusion. As noted by 
Fitelson (2005), the received view – according to which inductive strength is 
given by posterior probability – is not an adequate proposal for the 
formalization of inductive confirmation. This is because, in general, posterior 
probability is not sensitive to the probabilistic relevance of the premise to the 
conclusion of an inductive argument.  
Popper (1954) is one of the first to urge probabilistic relevance be 
considered as a desideratum for measures of confirmation. In response to 
Popper’s request, Carnap (1962a) defines two different kinds of confirmation: 
confirmation as firmness and confirmation as increase in firmness. While the 
former does not require probabilistic relevance and is properly captured by 
posterior probability, the latter presupposes that premise is relevant to 
conclusion. Carnap (1962a) does not propose any adequate relevance measure 
of confirmation and, oddly enough, he does not advocate Kemeny and 
Oppenheim’s (1952) measure as an example of proper relevance measure either. 
This curious sequence of events in the epistemological history of inductive logic 
may explain why relevance-based approaches have never gained as much 
interest as the received view. 
Similarly, in the psychological field, little attention has been paid to the 
relevance of premise to conclusion. Yet, the following studies are worth 
mentioning. Work by Medin et al. (2003) has identified some relevance effects in 
category-based induction. These effects prove how salient relations between 
premise and conclusion categories may direct the evaluation of inductive 
strength. Tentori et al. (2007) and Crupi et al. (2007) have employed a 
relevance-based approach to the study of induction, on both the experimental 
and the theoretical account. 
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The same kind of approach followed by Tentori et al. (2007) and Crupi et 
al. (2007) has been used in the present study. The novelty element that 
characterizes both the theoretical and the experimental researches discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3 is the employment of uncertain evidence. Although people are 
generally prone to reduce or underestimate uncertainty in everyday life, the 
ability to recognize it and take it into account is essential in many situations. In 
most inductive contexts from real life, people have to deal with uncertain 
evidence. 
In the theoretical study presented in §2.3, the Bayesian confirmation 
theory has been extended to cases in which the available evidence is not 
acquired with certainty. Jeffrey conditionalization played an essential role in 
generalizing a particular class of relevance measure of confirmation, called P-
incremental. It seems that, before the aforesaid theoretical study, such a 
generalization had never been analyzed by confirmation theorists, and much less 
experimentally investigated by cognitive scientists interested in inductive 
reasoning. 
One interesting question in the psychology of inductive reasoning is 
whether the normatively soundest confirmation measures are also the most 
accurate from a descriptive point of view. Measures K and L, albeit not ordinally 
equivalent, share several properties which single them out as particularly 
compelling normative models. Experiments I and II have been conceived as an 
empirical test of the descriptive adequacy of K and L relative to judgments of 
confirmation by uncertain evidence. 
In Experiment I the uncertainty of evidence was explicitly manipulated by 
means of numerical values, whereas in Experiment II the uncertainty of evidence 
was implicitly manipulated by means of ambiguous pictures. The results show 
that people’s judgments are highly correlated with those predicted by K and L. 
This does not imply that the probabilistic computations underlying Bayesian 
measures of confirmation should be factually regarded as models of the 
cognitive processes that guide assessments of inductive strength. It is well 
documented that people often depart from the Bayesian prescriptions, when 
92  
4. Conclusion 
 
 
 
judging probability (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). People seem to apply 
the rational rules of probability only under particular conditions (Girotto & 
Gonzalez, 2001). No matter what the computations leading to confirmation 
judgments with uncertain evidence are, the experiments show that some 
peculiar aspects of such judgments can be captured, to a significant degree, by 
normatively appropriate measures. The interaction between normative and 
descriptive accounts might be beneficial for the study of inductive reasoning, as 
it has been in other domains of human reasoning. 
From the results obtained in the two experimental studies illustrated in 
chapter 3, people appear to be sensitive to the degree of evidential uncertainty. 
This supports the centrality of inductive reasoning in cognition, and opens the 
path to further investigations in more naturalistic settings. 
 
 
4.2 Future directions 
Experiments I and II were devised to test whether people properly estimate the 
impact of an uncertain piece of evidence on a given hypothesis. To further 
explore inductive confirmation by uncertain evidence, new experimental 
scenarios could be implemented. One possibility is to conceive settings in which 
the prior probability of evidence –  – is not fixed to the value of 0.5 (recall 
that  was set at 0.5 in both Experiments I and II). It is worth observing 
that situations where  ! 0.5 represent a special case, in the sense that 
evidence acquired with total uncertainty (i.e.,  ! 0.5) turns out to be 
confirmationally irrelevant to the hypothesis under consideration. This appears 
to be rather intuitive, as suggested by the results analyzed in §3.2.3 and §3.3.3 
(recall that confirmation judgments elicited in Experiment I and II largely 
comply with the theoretical distinction of positive, null and negative impact). 
Yet, if  g 0.5, it is no longer correct to judge evidence that is completely 
uncertain as confirmationally irrelevant. Experiments in which the prior 
probability of evidence is manipulated may serve to clarify whether naïve people 
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still conform to the condition (3.2) in §3.2.1 which defines relevance measures of 
confirmation. 
 In the two experimental studies presented earlier, confirmation 
judgments expressed by participants were compared with judgments predicted 
by the soundest Bayesian confirmation measures (K and L). It would be 
interesting and useful to contrast the predictive accuracy of relevance measures 
advocated in the domain of epistemology with models of induction proposed in 
the psychological field (e.g., the similarity-coverage model of Osherson et al., 
1990). 
 Finally, another line of inquiry could involve hypothesis testing in light of 
uncertain evidence. While a relevance-based approach to the study of induction 
was followed in the present research, hypothesis testing corresponds to the 
study of inductive reasoning based on the received view. As highlighted in 
different points throughout the current contribution, Jeffrey’s rule offers a 
proper principle to revise the probability of a hypothesis in situations where a 
piece of evidence is not certain. The issue of probability updating with uncertain 
evidence is at least as relevant as the issue of evaluating inductive strength. 
Nonetheless, it appears to have never been investigated in the psychology of 
reasoning. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Foundation of the theory of probability 
 
A probability function  is a function from a Boolean algebra ~ of propositions 
to the unit interval [0,1]. For all propositions  and  in ~,  must satisfy the 
following three axioms (see Kolmogorov, 1956): 
 
I.  x 0, 
II. If  is a logical necessary truth, then  ! 1, 
III. If  and  are mutually exclusive, then    !  M . 
 
According to Kolmogorov (1956), the conditional probability is defined in terms 
of unconditional probability, as shown by the following definition: 
 
Definition A.1: | ! ABAB , provided that  g 0. 
 
Informally, “” can be read as “the probability that proposition  is true”, 
and “|” can be read as “the probability that proposition  is true, given 
that proposition  is true”.  
 
Definition A.2: A probability model " ! ~, # consists of a Boolean algebra ~ 
of propositions, and a particular probability function # over the elements of ~.  
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Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2.1 
 
Provided that Z| 0 Z, if Z 5 ] 5 ` ,  
then Z,] 5 Z,`.                  (H.1) 
 
Theorem 2.1: Any Bayesian confirmation measure Z,] enjoying generalized 
P-incrementality satisfies (H.1). 
 
Proof: 
First of all, in what follows, I will posit Z 0 0, so that Z| is defined. 
Given that, I will prove that, assuming Z| 0 Z, Z 5 ] 5`  and Z,] enjoying generalised P-incrementality, the inequality Z,] 5 Z,` is verified. 
 By the probability calculus, the following equivalence can be derived: 
 
 Z| 0 Z     Z| 0 Z|                                       (A.1) 
 
Since by hypothesis, Z| 0 Z, then, by Equation (A.1), one has Z| 0 Z| as well, whence Z| > Z| 0 0. Also, by 
hypothesis, ] > Z 0 0. So the product of Z| > Z| and ] > Z will be itself greater than zero. The latter inequality can be 
algebraically manipulated as follows: 
 XZ| > Z|Y = ] > Z 0 0   Z| = ] > Z > Z| = ] > Z 0 0  Z| = ] > Z M Z| = ] > Z 0 0  Z| = Z M Z| = Z 5  
 Z| = ] M Z| = ]                                                   (A.2) 
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By the theorem of total probabilities, Equation (A.2) can be rewritten as: 
 
 Z 5 Z| = ] M Z| = ]                                (A.3) 
 
Since, by hypothesis, also `  > ] 0 0, an analogous manipulation 
yields: 
 
 Z| = ] M Z| = ] 5 
  Z| = `  M Z| = `                                        (A.4) 
 
And, by Jeffrey conditionalization, Equations (A.3) and (A.4) imply: 
 
 Z 5 ] 5 `                                                                                 (A.5) 
 
By enjoying generalised P-incrementality, Z,] is by definition a strictly 
increasing function of the update probability of . Hence, from Equation (A.5) it 
immediately follows that: 
 Z,] 5 Z,` 
 
Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C: Sequence of screen displays produced by Java 
application for Experiment I 
 
Figure C.1: Instruction of Experiment I (part 1) 
 
 
 
Note. All materials are translated from Italian. 
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Figure C.2: Instruction of Experiment I (part 2) 
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Figure C.3: Instruction of Experiment I (part 3) 
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Figure C.4: Instruction of Experiment I (part 4) 
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Figure C.5: Confirmation task in Experiment I (part 1) 
 
 
 
Note. Participants were informed about a double drawing (first the drawing of a group, then of 
a student from that group). Then, they were presented with a set of four inductive 
arguments each involving the same information about the probability of the student 
being a male vs. female, coupled with one among four different hypotheses. The 
hypotheses employed were: “owns a 10,000 euro motorbike”, “owns a 10,000 euro 
necklace”, “usually has a beard shave”, “usually applies eye make-up”. 
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Figure C.6: Confirmation task in Experiment I (part 2) 
 
 
 
Note. Participants were asked to estimate inductive confirmation concerning the four 
arguments presented. In order to do so, they were asked to drag each argument icon on 
the ‘impact scale’, thus assigning it a value. In particular, they were instructed to place 
the argument icon as much to the right [left] as they judged the information given about 
the uncertainty of evidence to increase [decrease] the plausibility of the hypothesis. 
Once they expressed their judgments, a novel double sampling was said to have been 
performed, and participants were requested to evaluate another set of inductive 
arguments; and so on for all seven sets. 
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Figure C.7: Probability task in Experiment I 
 
 
 
Note. After the confirmation task, participants were asked to consider again a group of 1,000 
students, 500 males and 500 females, and to answer four questions relative to each 
hypothesis. Here participants had to answer considering the hypothesis of “owning a 
10,000 euro necklace”. Complementary estimates were asked in order to increase 
accuracy. Participants could begin from the estimate they preferred; the software 
required each pair of complementary estimates to sum up to 500. 
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Appendix D: Sequence of screen displays produced by Java 
application for Experiment II 
 
Figure D.1: Instruction of Experiment II (part 1) 
 
 
 
Note. In Experiment II the uncertainty of evidence has been manipulated indirectly, by means 
of ambiguous pictures. 
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Figure D.2: Instruction of Experiment II (part 2) 
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Figure D.3: Instruction of Experiment II (part 3) 
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Figure D.4: Confirmation task in Experiment II (part 1) 
 
 
 
Note. No double sampling procedure was involved in this scenario. Participants were 
informed about the draw of a student from the larger sample of 1,000. The uncertainty 
of evidence concerning student’s gender was implicitly manipulated through the picture 
of her/his hand. At each trial, an enlarged picture of the hand appeared on the screen for 
10 seconds and participants were prompted to look at it very carefully and in detail. 
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Figure D.5: Confirmation task in Experiment II (part 2) 
 
 
 
Note. The picture of the drawn student’s hand automatically reduced in size, and participants 
were asked to answer two questions. Responses to those questions provided an estimate 
of participants’ perceived degree of uncertainty about the evidence concerning gender. 
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Figure D.6: Confirmation task in Experiment II (part 3) 
 
 
 
Note. A set of four inductive arguments was presented, while a reminder on the top-right of 
the screen reported the degree of uncertainty previously assigned to the evidence. 
Participants’ task was to estimate inductive confirmation. The hypotheses, as well as the 
scale employed and the rest of the procedure, were the same as in Experiment I. 
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